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Protecting Big Data in the Big Leagues:
Trade Secrets in Professional Sports
Lara Grow * & Nathaniel Grow**
Abstract
The protection of trade secrets within the professional sports
industry became a hot-button issue in the summer of 2015, after
news reports emerged revealing that officials from Major League
Baseball’s St. Louis Cardinals were under federal investigation for
having illegally accessed proprietary information belonging to their
league rival, the Houston Astros. Indeed, professional sports teams
in the United States and Canada often possess various forms of
proprietary information or processes—ranging from scouting
reports and statistical analyses to dietary regimens and
psychological assessment techniques—giving them a potential
competitive advantage over their rivals. Unfortunately, as with the
rest of the economy at-large, little empirical data exists regarding
either the types of proprietary information owned by these teams, or
the measures that teams are taking to protect their trade secrets.
Drawing upon freshly-collected survey data, this Article helps
to fill this void in the literature by providing novel empirical
evidence regarding the modern trade secret practices of the teams
in the four major North American professional sports leagues.
Based on the results of a first-of-its-kind survey conducted in the
spring of 2016 of the general counsels of teams in the four major
leagues, this Article sheds light on both the types of information
subjected to trade secret assertion by these firms, as well as the
methods they are using to safeguard their data. In the process, this
Article examines the implications of these survey results for the
professional sports industry, while also identifying potential new
lines of inquiry for future trade secret research.
* Visiting Lecturer of Business Law and Ethics, Kelley School of Business,
Indiana University (Bloomington).
** Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Kelley School of
Business, Indiana University (Bloomington).
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I. Introduction
Seal up your lips, and give no words but mum:
The business asketh silent secrecy.
—Shakespeare 1
A veil of secrecy has descended over sports unlike
anything the industry has ever seen.
—Matthew Futterman2
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act
1, sc. 2.
2. Matthew Futterman, Baseball After Moneyball, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405311190379150457658469168
3234216 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Society is currently in the midst of a “big data” revolution. 3
Across wide swaths of the economy, businesses are increasingly
marshalling previously unimaginable amounts of data to derive
valuable new insights in fields as diverse as health care,4 financial
services, 5 and transportation. 6 Indeed, through the use of data
analytics, firms can more efficiently “anticipate future needs and
concerns, plan strategically, avoid loss, and manage risk,” all for
the betterment of the bottom-line. 7
Nowhere has this big data revolution played out more
publicly—or, perhaps, more prominently—than in the professional
sports industry. Every day, millions of sports fans are exposed to
countless new and ever more sophisticated statistics while
watching their favorite teams play.8 Meanwhile, behind the
scenes, teams in all four major North American professional sports
leagues 9 are increasingly using statistical and data analysis to not
only formulate in-game strategy, but also to evaluate their players’
on-field performance, physical health, and even psychological
make-up. 10
3. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 393 (2014) (stating that “[w]e are on the cusp of a ‘Big
Data’ Revolution” in which “[i]ncreasingly large datasets are being mined for
important predictions and often surprising insights”).
4. See Janine S. Hiller, Healthy Predictions? Questions for Data Analytics
in Health Care, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 251, 251 (2016) (observing that “[b]ig data,
analytics, and predictive algorithms are poised to play a large part in the
transformation of health-care delivery in the United States”).
5. See Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1387 (2015) (noting “the advent of big-data-based
decision-making in the financial sectors”).
6. See Katherine Britton, Handling Privacy and Security in the Internet of
Things, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2016) (predicting that the transportation industry
will be able to derive “tremendous economic value realized as a result of Big
Data”).
7. Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big
Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013).
8. See Steve Eder, Modern Stats Bring WAR to Broadcast Booth, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2013, at A1 (noting that teams in professional baseball increasingly
expect their announcers to discuss advanced statistics during broadcasts).
9. For purposes of this Article, the four major North American sports
leagues are Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association
(NBA), National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League (NHL).
10. See David L. Gregory & Joseph Gagliano, A Message From the
Symposium Chairs, 22 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 163, 165 (2012) (finding
that professional sports teams use “the never-ending litany of increasingly
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Despite the growing importance of big data in the modern
economy, however, surprisingly little is known about the specific
manner in which firms—either in the professional sports industry
or the economy at-large—protect their proprietary information.
Because methods of data analysis are most commonly protected
under the law of trade secrecy, 11 and because trade secrets
generally lose their legal protection if they are disclosed publicly, 12
firms have traditionally been understandably reluctant to discuss
either the types of trade secrets they possess, or the steps that they
are taking to protect this information. 13
complex statistics . . . to evaluate and ‘value’ players”); see also Rian Watt, New
Technologies Are Forcing Baseball to Balance Big Data with “Big Brother”, VICE
SPORTS (May 27, 2016, 10:20 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/8qygbp
/new-technologies-are-forcing-baseball-to-balance-big-data-with-big-brother (last
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing the various ways in which MLB teams are
utilizing new biometric tracking technology to evaluate players) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 556
(2014) (stating that “[m]any big data practices can probably be maintained as
trade secrets”); see also Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing
Default Rules and Disclosure With Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1435 (2014)
(reporting that “many uses of Big Data are being kept as proprietary trade
secrets”); Matthew J. Frankel, Secret Sabermetrics: Trade Secret Protection in the
Baseball Analytics Field, 5 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 240, 250 (2012) (observing that
professional baseball teams “treat their [statistical] strategies and formulas as
trade secrets”). For a more in-depth discussion of the reasons why data analysis
is typically protected under trade secret law, see infra notes 50–51 and
accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II (discussing the legal requirements for obtaining trade
secret protection under U.S. and Canadian law).
13. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 295 (2009) (“[L]ittle statistical
analysis exists on either trade secrets or trade secret litigation. For trade secrets,
the explanation is simple—because trade secrets must be kept secret to qualify
for protection, there is little publicly available material to study.”); see also
Frankel, supra note 11, at 242 (“One possible explanation for the dearth of
scholarship or press reports in this area is that trade secrets are, by their nature,
a secret, and thus do not lend themselves to public exposition or dissection.”).
Indeed, the only prior studies that the authors could locate that (1) identified the
types of information that were being subjected to trade secret protection or
(2) discussed the specific methods that businesses were using to protect this
information, came from two industrial surveys conducted back in 1965 and 1971,
respectively. See generally J. ROGER O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES PROTECT
THEIR TRADE SECRETS (1971) [hereinafter O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES
PROTECT THEIR TRADE SECRETS] (reporting survey data regarding the trade secret
practices of small businesses in the early 1970s); J. ROGER O’MEARA, EMPLOYEE
PATENT AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS (1965) [hereinafter O’MEARA, EMPLOYEE
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This Article aims to help fill this void in the existing literature
by presenting freshly-collected data from the professional team
sports industry regarding both the types of information being
subjected to trade secret protection, as well as the manner in which
those secrets are being guarded. Drawing upon the results of a
survey recently conducted of the general counsels of teams
belonging to the four major North American professional sports
leagues, this Article sheds new light on the scope of trade secret
protection in the modern economy, as well as the steps that these
firms are taking to shield their increasingly valuable, but highly
sensitive, information.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part II briefly summarizes
the historical evolution of statistical and data analysis in the
professional sports industry, describing the various forms of
proprietary information that a modern-day sports team may
possess. 14 Part III follows by offering an overview of the law of
trade secrets in both the United States and Canada.15 Part IV then
presents our survey methodology and results, providing novel
empirical data regarding the manner in which North American
professional sports teams are asserting and protecting their rights
under trade secrecy law. 16 Finally, Part V concludes by discussing
the implications of this survey data, as well as offering some
recommendations for future research. 17
II. Propriety Information in the Professional Sports Industry
Since its inception, the professional sports industry has, to
varying degrees, relied on a plethora of statistical data to evaluate
players and help teams make roster decisions. As early as 1845—
nearly a quarter century before the first professional sports
franchise, the Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869, was established—
newspapers began printing box scores recapping the statistical
PATENT AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS] (reporting survey data regarding business’s
use of employee confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions to protect trade
secrets).
14. Infra Part II.
15. Infra Part III.
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Infra Part V.
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achievements of players in amateur baseball contests. 18 This focus
on documenting and quantifying the events transpiring on the
playing field was only natural; as the former president of baseball’s
National League, John Heydler, once explained: “‘Without records,
we would have merely a series of exhibitions, meaningless after
the game was over . . . [. Statistics] give a permanency to the game
which it could never otherwise enjoy.’”19
Of the four major North American team sports, statistical and
data analysis have historically been utilized most prominently in
professional baseball. 20 This is largely due to the fact that the
performance of individual baseball players is, in many respects,
easier to accurately quantify than it is for players in the other
professional sports. 21 Much of the action occurring on the playing
field in baseball is largely attributable to a one-on-one matchup
between a batter and a pitcher. 22 If the batter successfully hits the
ball and gets on base, he has “won” the matchup; conversely, if the
pitcher successfully gets the batter out, he is the victor. In contrast,
quantitatively assessing the performance of basketball, football,
and hockey players tends to be more difficult, as the performance
of any one player on any particular play hinges to a great extent
18. See ALAN SCHWARZ, THE NUMBERS GAME: BASEBALL’S LIFELONG
FASCINATION WITH STATISTICS 4 (2004) (reporting that “the first primitive
(baseball) box score—initially termed an ‘abstract’—appeared in the New York
Morning News on October 22, 1845”); see also Ed Edmonds, Arthur Soden’s
Legacy: The Origins and Early History of Baseball’s Reserve System, 5 ALBANY
GOV’T L. REV. 38, 40 (2012) (describing the Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869 as
“the first professional baseball team”).
19. SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at 25.
20. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the origin of sports
statistics in baseball).
21. See ROBERT E. KELLY, BASEBALL’S OFFENSIVE GREATS OF THE DEADBALL
ERA: BEST PRODUCERS RATED BY POSITION, 1901–1919, at 1 (2009) (“Of all sports,
baseball is the easiest to quantify.”).
22. See Roger Allan Ford, Trade Secrets and Information Security in the Age
of Sports Analytics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 4
(Michael McCann ed., forthcoming 2018), https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?
ID=47601307202212212210307710408109909502803202304302903002300900708811
71000651240200700330000211200381251211001060170910030841120100600380930
78009094069093018088112054044001072100099006105071070091106065002079085
088007000119027065097029122121102094088&EXT=pdf (“Baseball is less a team
game than a series of individual pitcher-hitter encounters, which made it easy to
develop statistics that predict, rather reliably, the number of runs a team will
score and the number of games it will win per year.”).

PROTECTING BIG DATA IN THE BIG LEAGUES

1573

not only on the performance of the player in question, but also on
his or her interactions with four or more teammates working
together as a single unit on the playing field. 23 As a result, due to
the more individualized nature of its competition, along with its
status as the continent’s oldest professional sport, baseball has
traditionally boasted the richest history of statistical and data
analysis of the four major North American sports. 24
Nevertheless, despite the fact that professional baseball teams
have had access to a veritable cornucopia of statistical data since
the industry’s formation, no MLB team went so far as to hire a
full-time statistician until 1947.25 That year, the Brooklyn
Dodgers, led by legendary executive Branch Rickey, hired Allan
Roth to provide the team with novel and proprietary statistical
analyses.26 Roth began charting every play that the Dodgers were
involved in that season, allowing him to formulate a series of
never-before-seen data regarding the performance of the team’s
players (such as a player’s batting average with runners on base,
and “spray charts” documenting where each of a particular hitter’s
batted balls landed). 27 The insights that Roth was able to glean
23. See id. at 5 (“Things become more complicated in sports like basketball
and football in which the data is more complex and player interactions matter
more.”).
24. See SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at xiv (“No other sport has anywhere near
such reverence for its statistics.”).
25. See id. at 54 (stating that Allan Roth was the “first full-time statistician
ever hired by a major league club”).
26. See id. (noting Allan Roth’s contribution to the major leagues); see also
Alan Roth, 74, Dies; Baseball Statistician, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/05/sports/alan-roth-74-dies-baseball-statistician.
html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (“Mr. Rickey was intrigued, and Mr. Roth became
the first full-time statistician hired by a major league club, touching off a trend
that has made the personal computer an essential element of clubhouse
paraphernalia.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); J. Gordon
Hylton, Why Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J.
391, 401 (1999) (describing Rickey as a “legendary baseball executive”). Rickey is
perhaps most famous for signing Jackie Robinson to play for the Dodgers in 1947,
thereby breaking baseball’s color barrier. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Major
League Baseball’s Monopoly Power and the Negro Leagues, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 291,
291 (1998) (noting that “Branch Rickey lured Jackie Robinson from the [Negro
League’s] Kansas City Monarchs to play for the Brooklyn Dodgers”).
27. See, e.g., Bryan Gottlieb, Comment, Avoiding Contractual Liability to
Baseball Players Who Have Used Performance Enhancing Drugs: Can We Knock
it Out of the Park?, 77 ALBANY L. REV. 615, 632 (2014) (observing that Allan Roth
developed a variety of new statistical measurements to assess players’
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from this data helped the Dodgers capture the National League
pennant twice in his first three years with the team.28
Despite Roth’s contributions, however, other teams were slow
to follow the Dodgers’ lead and hire their own full-time
statisticians. In fact, with a few passing exceptions, 29 it wasn’t
until the late-1990s and early-2000s that most MLB teams
employed their own statistical analysts.30
In the interim, amateur statisticians from outside of the
baseball establishment filled the void. 31 Led by pioneers like Bill
James and his fellow members of the Society for American
Baseball Research (SABR), baseball fans looking to more precisely
assess the performance and contributions of baseball players and
teams began to question and challenge the value of traditionally
relied-on statistics such as batting average, runs batted in (RBIs),
and pitchers’ win-loss records. 32 These efforts—popularly dubbed
“sabermetrics”—gained momentum in the 1990s, when the
Internet allowed what had previously been a collection of
geographically dispersed enthusiasts to more easily collaborate
with one another electronically. 33 Through websites such as
performance).
http://losangeles.
28. See
Year-By-Year
Results,
L.A.
DODGERS,
dodgers.mlb.com/la/history/year_by_year_results.jsp (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
(reporting that the Brooklyn Dodgers finished first in the National League in both
1947 and 1949) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. For instance, the Houston Astros temporarily hired a statistician in
1979, while the Oakland Athletics employed one in the 1980s. SCHWARZ, supra
note 18, at 136, 219–20.
30. See Brad Millington & Rob Millington, ‘The Datafication of Everything’:
Toward a Sociology of Sport and Big Data, 32 SOC. SPORT J. 140, 153 (2015)
(quoting Moneyball author Michael Lewis, “[t]he virus that infected professional
baseball in the 1990s, the use of statistics to find new and better ways to value
players and strategies, has found its way into every major sport”).
31. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 261–63 (recounting the history of the
fan-based statistical revolution in professional baseball).
32. See Jack Moore, How Wall Street Strangled the Life Out of Sabermetrics,
VICE SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014, 8:30 AM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/
aem895/how-wall-street-strangled-the-life-out-of-sabermetrics (last visited Sept.
21, 2017) (finding that “for men like Pete Palmer and Bill James, some of the
earliest popular sabermetric authors, sabermetrics centered around
understanding, around reconciling the differences between what they saw on the
field and how those within baseball said the game was played and won”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See Millington & Millington, supra note 30, at 145 (noting that “it is an
increasingly accepted premise that computers, together with the drive to know
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Baseball Prospectus, and later FanGraphs, statistically inclined
fans created a variety of new metrics to better evaluate the
performance of baseball players, tools that have subsequently been
incorporated by professional teams’ in-house statisticians. 34
Sabermetrics was thrust into the mainstream—both within
the baseball industry and among the public at-large—by the
publication of Michael Lewis’ best-selling book, Moneyball: The Art
of Winning an Unfair Game, in 2003.35 Moneyball documented the
efforts of MLB’s Oakland Athletics, led by the team’s general
manager, Billy Beane, to challenge the baseball industry’s
then-conventional wisdom by using sabermetric principles to
identify and exploit inefficiencies in the way in which most teams
assessed and valued their players. 36 For instance, by targeting
batters with high on-base percentages37—a trait undervalued by
most teams at the time—the Athletics were able to build offenses
that helped propel the team to the playoffs for four straight seasons
in the early-2000s, all despite the fact that the team boasted one
of MLB’s lowest player payrolls. 38 By recounting this story,
Moneyball propelled sabermetric principles into the limelight,
helping introduce the masses to new ways of thinking about the
sport. 39 As a result, practically every team in MLB today utilizes
sabermetric principles to at least some extent when making
personnel decisions, often building upon the insights of those

the (consuming) population, have helped spur the arrival of an Age of Big Data”
in sports).
34. See SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at 230–31 (discussing the importance of the
Baseball Prospectus website in the sabermetrics revolution).
35. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
(2003).
36. See id. at xiv (explaining that “the Oakland A’s general manager, Billy
Beane, had set about looking for inefficiencies in the game”).
37. On-base percentage measures the rate at which a hitter reaches base
(whether via a hit, walk, or by being hit by a pitch) out of the hitter’s total number
of plate appearances (i.e., number of times at bat).
38. See LEWIS, supra note 31, at 59 (stating that the Athletics’ “corporate
culture [centered] around a single baseball statistic: on-base percentage”).
39. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 263 (stating that “[s]abermetrics was first
introduced to the non-baseball obsessed through the publication in 2003 of
Michael Lewis’s best-selling book, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair
Game”).
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working in the public domain to create their own proprietary
statistical analyses.40
In contrast to the experience of professional baseball, the other
major North American sports leagues have generally been slower
to incorporate their own forms of advanced data analytics. 41 That
being said, the NBA is, by most accounts, the second most
advanced league when it comes to statistical analysis, with
professional basketball teams increasingly developing their own
proprietary methods to look for any possible competitive
advantage that can be gleaned from newer, more precise statistical
measurements.42 Meanwhile, although franchises in the NFL and
NHL generally lag behind their MLB and NBA counterparts when
it comes to developing their own advanced statistical models, 43
teams in both sports have slowly been making strides in this area
as well in recent years.44
40. See SCHWARZ, supra note 18, at 213 (reporting that “by 2002 most major
league organizations had someone either on staff, or retained as a consultant, to
conduct sabermetric studies to evaluate players and other moves”); see also Jack
Moore, Baseball ProGUESTus: The Secret History of Sabermetrics, BASEBALL
PROSPECTUS (July 16, 2013), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?
articleid=21234 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (concluding that “[e]very major
league team has established an analytics department, in some form”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See BENJAMIN BAUMER & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE SABERMETRIC
REVOLUTION: ASSESSING THE GROWTH OF ANALYTICS IN BASEBALL, at xii (2013)
(claiming that it is “not surprising that since its early days, baseball has produced
a copious quantitative record” as compared to other sports).
42. See, e.g., Scott Bukstein, A New Solution for Salary Disputes:
Implementing Salary Arbitration in the National Basketball Association, 22
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 25, 32 (2011) (noting the “increasing use of analytics and
sabermetrics for player and team performance in basketball”); see also Ehran
Khan, Advanced NBA Stats for Dummies: How to Understand the New Hoops
Math, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 18, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
1813902-advanced-nba-stats-for-dummies-how-to-understand-the-new-hoops-mat
h (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (summarizing the most popular advanced statistics
being used in the NBA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See, e.g., Kevin Clark, The NFL’s Brewing Information War, RINGER
(June 2, 2016, 1:13 PM), https://www.theringer.com/2016/6/2/16077478/nflinformation-war-data-advanced-stats-73b6eee2d39f (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
(finding that NFL teams generally lag “behind other professional leagues amid
an otherwise widespread analytics revolution”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
44. For a brief overview of the use of advanced statistics in the NFL, see
Methods to Our Madness, FOOTBALL OUTSIDERS, http://www.football
outsiders.com/info/methods (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing a plethora of
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The use of data and statistical analysis in the sports industry
is only likely to continue to grow in the future, as new technologies
enable teams in all four leagues to assess their players’
performance in previously unimaginable ways.45 Over the past few
years, for instance, each of the four major North American sports
leagues have begun to implement new systems that, through the
use of intricate series of cameras and sensors, allow teams to track
and record every event that transpires on the playing field in much
more precise detail than ever before. 46 In MLB, for example, the
league’s new StatCast system not only records players’ every
movement on the field, but also tracks the flight of the baseball
itself, including both the number of times the ball rotates after
being thrown by a pitcher, and the velocity and angle with which
it leaves a hitter’s bat.47 Similarly, in the NFL, all players were
fitted with special shoulder pads for the 2015 season that included
two tiny computer chips, allowing a series of receivers located
throughout the stadium to continuously record each player’s
location and movement.48 The copious amounts of data produced
advanced statistics in football) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Similarly, for an overview of the emerging use of advanced statistics in
professional hockey, see Sam Page, Fancy Stats Primer: Your Guide to Hockey’s
Advanced Analytics Jargon, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.si.com/nhl/2014/09/28/fancy-stats-primer-advanced-analytics-corsifenwick-pdo-qualcomp (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (overviewing how to
meaningfully breakdown and understand hockey statistics) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Millington & Millington, supra note 30, at 156 (predicting that “with
the advent of technologies . . . with the steady ‘flow’ of analysts, investors, and
ideas” in Big Data in sports, “the volume and variety of data” will only continue
to grow).
46. See, e.g., Christian Frodl, Commercialisation of Sports Data: Rights of
Event Owners Over Information and Statistics Generated About Their Sports
Events, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 55, 62 (2015) (observing that “[t]he National
Basketball Association (NBA) announced an agreement with STATS in 2013 to
install player-tracking systems at all NBA games”).
47. See Ben Lindbergh, Ready, Set, Statcast: What the New Data Stream Can
Teach Us About MLB, GRANTLAND (April 9, 2015), https://grantland.com/thetriangle/mlb-2015-statcast-advanced-hitting-pitching-defensive-stats/?print=1
(last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (explaining that StatCast “captur[es] the physical
position of every player, pitch, and batted ball many times per second”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Clark, supra note 43 (noting that the NFL’s tracking system
“decipher[s] all movements on the field, measuring everything from player speed
to how open a pass-catcher manages to get on a given play”).
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by these new tracking systems promise to yield untold new
insights into each of the four major sports, and thus represents a
potentially significant source of competitive advantage for the
teams that are best able to develop proprietary methods for
analyzing this new information and incorporate it into their
decision-making processes. 49
At the same time, teams across the professional sports
industry are also beginning to make use of new biometric-tracking
technology, enabling them to monitor their players
physiologically. 50 Through the use of Fitbits and similar devices,
for instance, teams can now measure the number of calories their
players consume and burn in a given day, their heart rate during
practice and games, and even the amount and quality of their sleep
each night.51 Meanwhile, other new technologies such as Motus
sensors enable teams to view, in real-time, the amount of stress
that athletes are placing on their various joints and tendons,
especially those that are most susceptible to injury.52 The data
gleaned from these sorts of biometric tracking devices represents
another source of potential competitive advantage for teams,
allowing them to fine-tune dietary and physical training regimens
to help their players avoid injury and achieve peak physical
performance on the playing field. 53
49. See Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive Advantage, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 61, 63 (2011) (stating that “[f]irms continuously seek a competitive
advantage over rivals”).
50. See Watt, supra note 10 (discussing the use of biometric-tracking
technology in professional baseball).
51. See id. (observing same); see also Steven I. Friedland, Of Clouds and
Clocks: Police Location Tracking in the Digital Age, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 165, 167
(2015) (explaining that Fitbit devices “track[] a person’s everyday health and
fitness”).
52. See The Associated Press, Putting Data Science on a Player’s Sleeve, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/sports/baseball/puttingdata-science-on-a-players-sleeve.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting that
through the use of “five blue sensors attached” to a player’s body, Motus sensors
“record[] 39 sets of measurements, including shoulder rotation, hip speed and
stride”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. See Robert Guthrie, The Future of Biometric Tracking Will Make Step
Counters Look Like Antiques, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 13, 2016, 4:30 PM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/health-fitness/future-of-biometrics-beyond-thewrist-tracker/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (claiming that advances in biometric
technology “offer the opportunity to find out exactly what your body is capable of,
helping customers truly fine-tune their fitness, nutrition, and general
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In addition to advanced statistical and data analysis, sports
franchises also derive value from more traditional forms of
proprietary information. For instance, many teams closely guard
their playbooks—compilations of all of their strategies and plays—
along with the various signals (hand, verbal, or otherwise) used by
coaches to relay play calls to players during a game. 54 Similarly,
scouting reports regarding the strengths and weaknesses of both a
franchise’s own players, as well as those playing for opposing
teams, are another type of information that clubs may wish to
protect, as are records documenting a franchise’s prior and
on-going trade negotiations with other clubs.55 Meanwhile, like
any business, a professional sports team is also likely to possess
proprietary information relating to its general business plans,
marketing strategies, and customer lists, all of which will also
usually be of commercial value. 56 As with newer, more advanced
forms of statistical and data analysis, each of these types of
proprietary information represent another source of potential
competitive advantage for sports teams.57
Lest there were any doubt regarding the value that sports
franchises place on these various forms of proprietary information,
those questions were largely laid to rest in June 2015, when news
well-being”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
54. See Rice Ferrelle, Note, Combating the Lure of Impropriety in
Professional Sports Industries: The Desirability of Treating a Playbook as a
Legally Enforceable Trade Secret, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 149, 150 (2003) (“In the
NFL, playbooks are treated like trade secrets.”); see also Samuel J. Horovitz, If
You Ain’t Cheating You Ain’t Trying: “Spygate” and the Legal Implications of
Trying Too Hard, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 305, 315–16 (2009) (describing the
lengths teams will go to protect their playbooks).
55. See Nat’l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985, 995–96
(W.D. Wash. 2012) (concluding that scouting reports of players’ abilities are
potentially protectable under trade secret law); see also Matthew J. Frankel,
Hackers Strike Out: Recent Cases of Alleged Sports Analytics IP Theft, 1 J. SPORTS
ANALYTICS 83, 84 (2015) (noting the sensitivity of a “team’s confidential
player-evaluation programs”).
56. See Anne M. Wall, Sports Marketing and the Law: Protecting Proprietary
Interests in Sports Entertainment Events, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 77, 138 (1996)
(observing that “[b]usiness plans, marketing strategies, formal game plans,
technical information, financial data, and customer lists” are all potentially
valuable commercial information for a sports team).
57. See id. at 137 (noting that “[d]isclosure of a company’s know-how and
trade secrets to competitors or to the public could result in a loss of the company’s
competitive advantage”).
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reports emerged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
was investigating whether officials from MLB’s St. Louis
Cardinals had illegally accessed, or hacked into, an internal
computer network belonging to their league rival, the Houston
Astros. 58 The government had launched its investigation nearly a
year earlier, after notes memorializing the Astros’ trade
discussions with other clubs were taken from the team’s network—
whimsically named “Ground Control”—and leaked to the sports
website Deadspin. 59 While the FBI’s investigation into the incident
remains ongoing, to date one former member of the Cardinals’
front office staff, Christopher Correa, the team’s then-scouting
director, has pled guilty to charges that he illegally accessed the
Astros’ internal network in order to view the team’s proprietary
information (including Houston’s player scouting reports and
statistical analyses, in addition to the leaked trade-discussion
notes). 60
This incident highlights the growing importance of
proprietary data in the professional team sports industry, and thus
illustrates the need for sports franchises to take measures to
secure and legally protect their most valuable and sensitive
information. 61
58. See Michael S. Schmidt, Cardinals Investigated for Hacking Into Astros’
Database, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2015, at A1 (“Investigators have uncovered
evidence that Cardinals employees broke into a network of the Astros that
housed special databases the team had built” and “[i]nternal discussions about
trades, proprietary statistics and scouting reports were compromised.”).
59. See Barry Petchesky, Leaked: 10 Months Of The Houston Astros’ Internal
Trade Talks, DEADSPIN (June 30, 2014, 1:19 PM), http://deadspin.com/leaked-10months-of-the-houston-astros-internal-trade-1597951970 (last visited Sept. 21,
2017) (“Documents purportedly taken from Ground Control and showing 10
months’ worth of the Astros’ internal trade chatter have been posted online
at . . . a site where users can anonymously share hacked or leaked information.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. See Plea Agreement at 10, United States v. Correa, Case No.
4:15-CR-00679 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016), ECF. No. 15 (recounting that Correa
accessed the Astros’ evaluations of current and prospective players, the team’s
ongoing statistical analysis projects, and trade discussions). On July 18, 2016,
Judge Lynn Hughes of the Southern District of Texas sentenced Correa to
forty-six months in jail and ordered him to pay the Astros $279,038 in restitution
for his unauthorized access of the team’s computer network. Associated Press,
Ex-Cardinals Official Gets Nearly Four Years for Hacking, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
2016, at B10.
61. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cardinals-Astros’ hacking affair, MLB
has reportedly encouraged its teams to take greater steps—including the
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III. The Law of Trade Secrets in the United States and Canada
As noted above, firms within both the professional sports
industry and the economy at-large most frequently rely on the law
of trade secrets to protect their data analysis and related forms of
proprietary information. 62 This is true for several reasons. First, it
is questionable whether much of this sort of information would
qualify for protection under other forms of intellectual property
law.63 Second, even if it did, proving the unauthorized use of a
proprietary method of data analysis, for example, would be nearly
impossible, since any infringing activities would usually be carried
out behind closed doors without producing any readily discernible
evidence of the infringement. Therefore, to the extent that a North
American professional sports team wishes to legally protect its
proprietary data, trade secrecy law will often prove to be its only
practical option.
Consequently, an overview of the law of trade secrets is in
order. This Part, therefore, provides a summary of the current
state of trade secrecy law in both the United States and Canada
(the latter of which currently houses teams in three of the four
major North American sports leagues).
A. United States
In contrast to the constitutional underpinnings of patent and
copyright law, American trade secrecy law has evolved from the
common law.64 As the labor market shifted in the 1800s from an
modernization of their employment contracts—to protect their intellectual
property. See Derrick Goold, MLB Commissioner: Teams Need to Protect
Intellectual Property, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/birdland/mlb-commissionerteams-need-to-protect-intellectual-property/article_4c2ed647-65e6-5edd-b17ae3cdcf510fd3.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See supra note 11 (discussing the fact that data analysis methods are
most commonly protected under trade secret law).
63. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 11, at 553–55 (observing that “[a]lgorithms
that amount to abstract ideas, for instance, do not meet the threshold eligibility
requirements for patent protection,” while “copyright protection does not provide
exclusivity in processes or methods”).
64. See Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL.
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apprenticeship
model
to
greater
industrialization,
nineteenth-century American courts began to recognize ownership
in confidential business information, importing common law
doctrines established during the English Industrial Revolution. 65
In an effort to summarize and harmonize the growing body of
state laws on trade secrecy, the American Law Institute included
the topic in its Restatement (First) of Torts (Restatement),
published in 1939.66 The Restatement defined a trade secret as
“any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one’s business, and which gives [the business] an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it.”67 In addition, it required that secrecy was needed
in order for the confidential information to receive legal
protection. 68 For liability to arise for the misappropriation of a
trade secret, however, the Restatement specified that the
PROP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (“Whereas copyright and patent law in the United States
find legal justification in the Constitution and implementing federal statutes,
trade secret law grew out of the common law and has now been codified separately
in most states.”).
65. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 525 (1837) (citing English
case law, this is the first reported U.S. case involving the protection of a trade
secret, specifically the method of making chocolate); see also Benjamin A.
Emmert, Comment, Keeping Confidence with Former Employees: California
Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade Secret Law,
40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2000) (noting early American reliance on
nineteenth-century English trade secret case law).
66. David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets are Increasingly
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1096 (2012) (“When the Restatement of
Torts was published in 1939, it included a section summarizing the law of trade
secrets.”).
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939); see also
Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L.
REV. 317, 325 (2015) (describing the history and content of the trade secrecy
provisions of the Restatement (First) of Torts). Notably, the Restatement also
failed to protect negative information, i.e., knowledge about how not to do
something, as well as “single use” information lacking a continuous business use.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (stating that a trade secret
“differs from other secret information in business in that it is not simply
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of business”); see also
Risch, supra note 64, at 8 (noting the Restatement’s more restrictive definition of
a trade secret, excepting “single use” information); Emmert, supra note 65, at
1176–77 (observing the failure of the Restatement to protect negative information
and information with a “short life span, such as a contract for sale or a marketing
plan”).
68. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
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information must have either been discovered by “improper
means,” or else disclosed or used in breach of a duty of confidence. 69
Although the Restatement was frequently cited by courts, “due to
[its] nonbinding nature . . . trade secret law remained
geographically inconsistent, developing unevenly from state to
state.”70
In an attempt to overcome this geographic inconsistency, trade
secret law in the United States was eventually codified in three
primary statutes: the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the
Economic Espionage Act (EEA), and—most recently—the Defend
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). 71 This subpart reviews each of these
three statutory provisions in turn.
1. Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws attempted to address the shortcomings of the Restatement
by “codify[ing] existing common law standards and . . . provid[ing]
a uniform approach to trade secret misappropriation among the
states” through its enactment of the UTSA in 1979.72 Today,
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
version of the UTSA. 73 Meanwhile, despite not having formally
enacted the UTSA themselves, both of the two outlier states—New

69.
70.
71.

Id. § 757(a)–(b).
Almeling, supra note 66, at 1096–97.
See generally BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RES. SERV., PROTECTION OF TRADE
SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION
(2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R43714.pdf (summarizing the current law and
legislation governing trade secrets in the United States).
72. Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 432–33 (1995).
73. See Latest Updates on Federal Trade Secrets Legislation, SEYFARTH
SHAW,
http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/latest-update-on-federal-trade-secretlegislation/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (noting that Texas is the most recent
adoptee of the UTSA with the two holdout states, Massachusetts and New York,
adhering to the common law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also Seaman, supra note 67, at 330 (noting that the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition, promulgated in 1995, generally mirrors the provisions of the
UTSA and “has had only a modest impact at best on the development of trade
secret law”).
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York and Massachusetts—impose similar requirements in order
for trade secret protection to arise. 74
Specifically, in order to establish a claim for misappropriation
of a trade secret under the UTSA, a plaintiff must show that (1) a
legally protectable trade secret exists; and (2) the defendant
acquired the trade secret by improper means. 75
a. Existence of a Trade Secret
as:

As to the first requirement, the UTSA defines a trade secret
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy. 76

Parsing this language, the UTSA requires two elements to
establish the existence of a trade secret.
First, a plaintiff must be able to show that its trade secret
possesses economic value from not being “generally known.” 77
Under this standard, courts have held that information has
economic value if a competitor would have to expend time and
money to independently discover the information and would
materially benefit from its discovery. 78 Meanwhile, a trade secret
74. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 252 (reporting that the states that have
not yet adopted the UTSA nevertheless impose similar standards on parties
seeking to protect their trade secrets). However, it should be noted that even in
states that have adopted the UTSA, some courts nonetheless “continue to invoke
principles from cases decided under the First Restatement of Torts.” Geraldine
Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of
Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 871
(2002).
75. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information
Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1653 (1998) (defining the scope of the term “trade
secret” under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
76. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996).
77. Id.
78. See John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: The Irreparable Damage of the
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is not generally known so long as it has not “escap[ed] into the
mainstream of public knowledge.” 79 Along these lines, “absolute
secrecy” is not required. 80 Instead, a trade secret may properly be
“shared with employees, independent contractors, [or] third-party
business partners” without losing its legal protection, so long as
these individuals have a need to know the information and are
made aware of its confidentiality. 81
Second, a plaintiff must also be able to show that it has taken
reasonable measures to maintain the secrecy of its proprietary
information in order for a legally protectable trade secret to exist
under the UTSA. 82 This is a fact-specific inquiry. 83 Courts in this
respect often engage in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing the
necessity of a company taking adequate precautions to protect its
trade secrets against concerns that these measures not be unduly
burdensome. 84 Indeed, many courts view the efforts to maintain
secrecy as a function of the value of the underlying trade secret. In
other words, “[s]ome courts may reason that there is a direct
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 148 (1998)
(explaining how courts define whether information is generally known).
79. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.04(2)(a) (2011).
80. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade
Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (observing that it is well established
that “reasonable efforts do not require absolute secrecy”); see, e.g., Sheets v.
Yamaha Motors Corp., 849 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining relative
secrecy under Louisiana law).
81. Frankel, supra note 11, at 253.
82. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996).
83. See Rowe, supra note 80, at 2 (“This [reasonable measures] standard is
very flexible, and intuitively necessitates a fact-intensive case-by-case
determination that considers a host of factors in trying to ascertain
reasonableness.”).
84. See id. at 9
These decisions necessitate a balancing between using sufficient
precautions to protect a company’s secret on the one hand, while not
imposing overly-burdensome precautions that would impair the
functioning of its business on the other hand. The inquiry necessarily
calls for a cost-benefit analysis, which varies in each case based on the
costs of the protective measures relative to the attendant benefits of
protecting the information.
POOLEY, supra note 79, at § 4.04(2)(b); see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he answer [to what is
reasonable to maintain secrecy] depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that
will vary from case to case and so require estimation and measurement by persons
knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved.”).

1586

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2017)

relationship between the value of the information and the extent
to which the company made efforts to protect it such that the more
valuable the information to the company, the more costly or
extensive the measures ought to be to protect it.” 85
Ultimately, a company need not undertake “‘[h]eroic’ efforts”
to protect the secrecy of its trade secrets. 86 Instead, examples of
sufficient reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy may include
electronic surveillance, computer passwords, and physical
measures to secure or lock the information. 87 Among the many
potential tools for maintaining secrecy at a company’s disposal, two
of the most commonly used tend to be requiring employees to sign
(1) a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement (NDA) and/or
(2) a non-compete agreement.88
2. Non-Disclosure Agreements
One way that a company can establish that it is taking
reasonable measures to protect its trade secrets is the use of an
NDA. 89 An NDA is often included as part of an employment or
independent contractor agreement, and typically specifies: “(1) a
description of the information to be held in confidence; (2) a bar
against the use of such information on behalf of oneself or a third
party; (3) a bar against disclosure of such information to a third
85. Rowe, supra note 80, at 10.
86. Frankel, supra note 11, at 253.
87. See Rowe, supra note 80, at 11
The language the courts use is not always consistent, but courts often
look for the use of the following kinds of security measures in assessing
reasonableness: (1) confidentiality agreements; (2) exit interviews
reminding departing employees of their confidentiality obligations;
(3) security badges to enter the premises or secured areas; (4) security
guards and closed-circuit television cameras; and (5) computer
passwords or access codes restricting access to certain personnel.
88. See, e.g., Tim McInturf & Tim Rybacki, Keeping Your Secrets Secret: An
Employer’s Primer on Trade Secret Protection, Noncompetition Agreements, and
Unfair Competition in Texas, 44 TEX. J. BUS. L. 233, 244–45 (describing
non-disclosure and non-compete provisions as “reasonable steps” to be taken to
“keep the trade secrets substantially secret”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. See Alan J. Tracey, The Contract in the Trade Secret Ballroom—A
Forgotten Dance Partner?, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 63 (2007) (noting “one of
the most commonly used and well-recognized approaches to safeguarding the
access of trade secret information is a confidentiality agreement”).
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party; and (4) a requirement to obtain the employer’s
authorization before making any such use or disclosure.” 90 While
the use of an NDA is not dispositive, in and of itself, in establishing
that reasonable measures have been taken to protect a trade
secret, many view NDAs as constituting “the core of trade secret
[protection],” helping to “fundamentally define the nature of the
information as valuable.”91 Thus, the lack of an NDA may cut
against a finding of reasonable measures to establish secrecy
unless the trade secret owner has undertaken other sufficient
precautions. 92
States adopt varying approaches when scrutinizing the
enforceability of NDAs. While some courts only enforce
“reasonable” NDAs, other courts do not require NDAs to contain
reasonable limitations.93 Even among courts engaging in a
reasonableness analysis, there is no uniform approach to the
definition of reasonable. 94 Nonetheless, these courts generally
consider nondisclosure covenants reasonable, and thus
enforceable, if they contain temporal, geographical, and/or
scope-of-activity limitations, as appropriate under the
circumstances. 95 In addition, like any contract, courts may elect
not to enforce an NDA if it is unconscionable or contrary to public
policy objectives of “fostering socially valuable activities, such as

90. Frankel, supra note 11, at 279.
91. POOLEY, supra note 79, at § 8.02[2]. In addition, an NDA also provides
the added benefit of giving “the employer a claim for breach of contract, in
addition to a claim for misappropriation” of a trade secret. Frankel, supra note
11, at 278.
92. See Tracey, supra note 89, at 68 (“Of course, the lack of a confidentiality
agreement will not eliminate trade secret protection in all cases if the trade secret
owner takes other significant steps to safeguard the information.”).
93. Compare Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality
Agreements Enforceable?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 639 (1999) (noting that
Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia only
enforce reasonable NDAs), with Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663
(Tex. App. Dallas 1992) (concluding that unlike a non-compete agreement, in
Texas there is no requirement that NDAs be reasonable to be enforceable).
94. See Bast, supra note 93, at 639 (“What is reasonable varies from state to
state.”).
95. See, e.g., id. at 640–41 (describing the reasonableness standards for
enforceability of NDAs in Illinois, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania).
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an employee proving employment discrimination or protecting
whistleblowers.” 96
3. Non-Compete Agreements
Another increasingly popular, 97 albeit controversial, 98
means of protecting trade secrets is the use of non-compete clauses
in an employment agreement. In other words, by imposing
restrictions on a departing employee’s ability to work in a
particular field and/or location for a certain time period, the
employer all but ensures that the former employee will not have
an opportunity to utilize or disclose any of its trade secrets. 99 Some
commentators note that in addition to being a reasonable measure
to protect the secrecy of a trade secret, non-competes also
effectively function as an alternative regime to trade secret law,
enabling employers to preemptively prevent any trade secret
misappropriation without the formalities of establishing a UTSA
violation. 100
96. Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory
to Determine Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 988 (2012).
97. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE
USAGE,
POTENTIAL
ISSUES,
AND
STATE
RESPONSE
3
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_
final2.pdf (“Research suggests that 18 percent, or 30 million, American workers
are currently covered by non-compete agreements.”).
98. See id. at 5 (citing evidence that “noncompetes . . . hamper the efficiency
of the economy as a whole by depressing wages, limiting mobility, and inhibiting
innovation”).
99. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45
AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 117 (2008) (“In the protection of trade secrets, noncompete
agreements are used as a means of minimizing the potential for trade secret
misappropriation by preventing an employee from working for a competitor or
engaging in a competing enterprise.”).
100. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 281 (arguing that “[i]f any former
employee cannot work for the competition, he is unlikely to hand over his former
employer’s trade secrets; and if the former employee attempts to do so, [he can be
stopped without] the ‘challenge and uncertainty of litigation to prove trade
secret’”); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 98, at 117 (recognizing the
preventative nature of a non-compete, which “allows employers to prevent any
improper use of trade secrets before it occurs rather than responding to a
misappropriation, when the harm (which may be significant) is done”); Charles
Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a Category of
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Nonetheless, courts place limitations on the enforceability of
non-competes. 101 While only two states, California 102 and North
Dakota,103 generally prohibit non-competes outright, the
remaining states typically employ a reasonableness test in
assessing the enforceability of a non-compete agreement. 104
Although states have adopted various tests guided by either a state
statute or common law development,105 a common standard
considers a non-compete reasonable, and thus enforceable, if it is
“necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably
Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 76 (2011)
(observing that “although courts tell us that the non-competition agreement
functions as an alternative type of trade secret regulation, it is a curious
alternative, seemingly free of the procedural and substantive safeguards found in
the official law of [trade secrets]”).
101. See 104 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 393 (“Many states have provided by
statute that covenants not to compete are void entirely or permitted with limited
exceptions. If a covenant not to compete is statutorily permitted, many courts will
only enforce the covenant if it is reasonable in its time and geographic
restrictions.”).
102. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 607 (1999) (“Other than two statutory exceptions (which track
the general rule outside of California) allowing enforcement of covenants not to
compete associated with the sale of a business, the [California] statute’s
prohibition [against non-competes] is essentially unqualified.”).
103. See Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L.
REV. 939, 945 (2012) (noting that North Dakota only allows non-competes in
connection with the sale of a business or dissolution of a partnership).
104. See Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and
Ethics of Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS.
L.J. 1, 17 (2012) (“In the vast majority of jurisdictions that do enforce
noncompetes, courts will use a reasonableness test.”); see also Norman D.
Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants
Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 751, 758 (2011) (“Whatever consensus exists among the enforcing states
has coalesced around a reasonableness test that balances the rights of parties to
the restrictive covenant while assessing the effect on the public interest.”); Moffat,
supra note 103, at 943, 948–49 (contending that despite “the fact that a majority
of states apply some version of this ‘reasonableness’ approach, there is hardly
uniformity or predictability even among those states” and further detailing the
“wide state-to-state variation in the treatment of non-compete provisions”).
105. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-To-Compete As The
Legal Infrastructure For Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 262 n.37 (2015)
(observing that states either address non-competes through common law or a
statute (citing BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2014))).
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limited in time and space, and consonant with the public
interest.” 106 This approach is similar to the standard set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts regarding the enforceability
of non-competes, which balances the employer’s need to protect
legitimate interests against the harm to the employee and
public. 107
Protecting trade secrets generally satisfies the legitimate
business interest requirement for the enforceability of a
non-compete, 108 while the reasonableness of the duration and
geography restraints is a more fact-specific inquiry. 109 When
analyzing the reasonableness of a geographic limitation, for
instance, courts will generally “uphold a restriction on competition
that is coextensive with the area where the [former employer] is
doing business.” 110 Non-competes have been upheld, for example,
when limited to a certain state or geographic radius from the
former employer. 111 Meanwhile, in terms of durational restraints,
106. Bishara & Orozco, supra note 96, at 758 (citing a Massachusetts
standard); see also Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“The issue of whether a restrictive covenant not to compete is enforceable by way
of an injunction depends in the first place upon whether the covenant is
reasonable in time and geographic area.”).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981); see
also Moffat, supra note 103, at 947–48 (noting that New York and Virginia, among
other jurisdictions, follow a similar balancing test in line with the Restatement).
108. See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 99, at 116 (“Traditionally, the courts
recognized two primary interests as legitimate justifications for a noncompete
agreement: the employer’s interests in protecting the goodwill of the business and
in protecting its trade secrets.”).
109. See NDSL, Inc. v. Patnoude, 914 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891 (W.D. Mich. 2012)
(discussing six different factors the court considers when evaluating the
reasonableness of a territorial restriction in a covenant not to compete).
110. Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000).
111. See Thomas M. Hogan, Uncertainty in the Employment Context: Which
Types of Restrictive Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 443
(2006) (citing Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 934, 937 (8th
Cir. 2002)) (enforcing a non-compete restricting competition within the state); see
also Ticor Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d at 66, 73 (upholding a non-compete that
prohibited a salesman from competing in the state of New York); A.N. Deringer,
Inc. v. Strough, 103 F.3d 243, 244–45, 249 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing a non-compete
restricting competition to a one-hundred-mile radius in Vermont). But see Nat’l
Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 104–05 (Mo. App. 1978)
(enforcing a two-year customer non-solicitation clause with no geographic
limitation that was limited to customers with whom the employee dealt); Angie
Davis, Eric D. Reicin & Marisa Warren, Developing Trends in Non-Compete
Agreements and Other Restrictive Covenants, 30 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 255, 256
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courts often consider a time limit of two years or less to be
reasonable,112 with “six months to one year being quite common
and ordinarily within the range of reasonableness.” 113
If a non-compete contains unreasonable terms—e.g., is found
to contain an overbroad geographic or durational restraint—courts
employ varying approaches to its enforceability. In a majority of
states, courts will reform the non-compete to be compliant with
state law.114 However, courts in some states will void the
non-compete in its entirety if any provision is unreasonable (the
so-called “red pencil” approach), while other courts will strike (or
“blue pencil”) the unreasonable terms but enforce the remaining
provisions provided they are grammatically correct. 115
In addition, courts require that an employer provide adequate
contractual consideration to the employee to support a
non-compete agreement.116 If a non-compete is entered into at the
inception of employment, the promise of a job is usually deemed
sufficient consideration. 117 However, if the non-compete is
(2015) (“With respect to the reasonableness of geographic limitations, an evolving
issue is whether a customer restriction may substitute for a geographic
limitation.”).
112. See Davis, Reicin & Warren, supra note 111, at 263 (“In general,
[non-compete] agreements extending beyond one or two years are scrutinized
more closely, particularly when the sale of a business is not involved.”); see also
Hogan, supra note 111, at 454 (noting cases upholding a two year non-compete
durational threshold).
113. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 108, at 186 n.45. But see EarthWeb, Inc.
v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to enforce the
one-year duration of a non-compete because it was “too long given the dynamic
nature of this [information technology] industry [and] its lack of geographical
borders”).
114. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 97, at 11 (explaining the three main
approaches to unenforceable non-competes, and noting that a majority of states
will reform or rewrite the non-compete to make it compliant with the law); see
also Moffat, supra note 103, at 950 (describing the partial enforcement or
reformation approach).
115. See Moffat, supra note 99, at 949–50 (detailing how courts implement
the red and blue pencil doctrines).
116. See Mark B. Wessman, Retaining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on
the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 795 (1996) (describing the
consideration required when non-compete clauses are included in employment
contracts).
117. See id.
In most cases if an employee agrees, at the time the employment
relationship commences, that upon termination he or she will not
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negotiated during the midst of a preexisting employment
relationship, some states will require additional consideration,
apart from continued employment (e.g., a promotion), to enforce
the non-compete.118
a. Misappropriation or Acquiring a Trade Secret by
Improper Means
Assuming that the plaintiff can establish the existence of a
legally protectable trade secret, one must also prove that that
information has been misappropriated in order to recover under
the UTSA.119 Notably, one need not show that the defendant has
actually used the misappropriated trade secret, as the UTSA
authorizes injunctive relief merely upon a defendant’s improper
Indeed,
acquisition
of
the
protected
information. 120
misappropriation of a trade secret can occur by either:
(1) acquiring a trade secret by improper means; or (2) knowingly
disclosing or using a trade secret acquired by improper means. 121
The UTSA includes a catalogue of examples of behavior
constituting such improper means, including, but not limited to,
“theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means.” 122 Conversely, the UTSA also identifies
compete with the employer or disclose confidential information
obtained from the employer, the initial promise of employment
supports the covenant not to compete as well as any other
commitments made by the employee.
118. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 105, at 264 (noting continued employment
is not sufficient consideration in some states for non-competes entered into during
employment).
119. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996) (defining
misappropriation as an “acquisition of a trade secret by means that should be
known to be improper and unauthorized disclosure or use of information that one
should know is the trade secret of another”).
120. Jeff Danley, Cadence v. Avant!: The UTSA and California Trade Secret
Law, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 292 (2004) (“Consequently, under the UTSA, a
trade secret holder may seek an injunction against another party that has
improperly acquired its trade secret even before that other party has used or
disclosed it.”).
121. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996).
122. Id. § 1.
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actions that do not qualify as misappropriation, including reverse
engineering, observing the information in public display, and
discovery by independent creation. 123
In addition to issuing an injunction preventing the disclosure
or use of another’s trade secrets,124 courts may even go so far as to
enjoin a departing employee from working for a competitor. Under
what is known as the inevitable disclosure doctrine, some courts
will issue an injunction preventing a company’s former employee
from working for a competing firm—even if the employee has never
signed a non-compete agreement—if it can be proven that a
“defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead [the defendant]
to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.” 125 In other words, even
though the departing employee has neither engaged in actual
misappropriation nor consented to a non-compete, a court may
nevertheless enjoin employment when the former employee
“cannot help but rely on [the former employer’s] trade secrets [in
his/her new position] . . . and [it has been shown] that these secrets
will enable [the new employer] to achieve a substantial
advantage.”126
When assessing the inevitability of disclosure—and thus
deciding whether to grant an injunction—courts evaluate the
following factors: (1) the degree of competition between the former
and current employer; (2) whether the job duties of the two
positions are comparable; and (3) “the extensiveness of the former
employee’s knowledge of technical or managerial trade secrets.” 127
Courts have found that these factors were satisfied, and thus
123. Id. § 1 cmt.
124. See id. § 2 cmt. (observing that “[i]njunctions restraining [the] future use
and disclosure of misappropriated trade secrets [are] frequently sought”).
125. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
126. Id. at 1270; see also Jonathan O. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of Inevitable
Disclosure: A Proposal to Balance Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 325, 328 (2000) (“This doctrine is so named because employers base an
inevitable disclosure claim on the theory that a former employee will inevitably
disclose the former employer’s trade secrets in the performance of his new job.”);
Shannon Aaron, Note & Comment, Using the History of Noncompetition
Agreements to Guide the Future of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1191, 1203 (2013) (“For most states, the inevitable disclosure
debate centers around the interpretation of Section 2 of the UTSA that states,
‘[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.’”).
127. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 99, at 155.
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awarded injunctive relief, in cases involving managerial
executives 128 and salespersons, 129 for example. Although a
majority of states have adopted some version of the inevitable
disclosure rule along these lines, 130 a growing number of
jurisdictions have opted to reject the doctrine. 131 California, for
instance, has declined to enforce the doctrine because it “‘creates a
de facto covenant not to compete’ and ‘runs[s] [sic] counter to the
strong public policy . . . favoring employee mobility.’” 132
In addition to injunctive relief, the UTSA also entitles
plaintiffs to damages for “both the actual loss caused by
misappropriation and [any] unjust enrichment” received by the
misappropriator. 133 Punitive damages and attorney’s fees may also
be awarded for willful and malicious misappropriation. 134
4. Economic Espionage Act
The law of trade secrecy was first federalized and criminalized
in 1996 with the passage of the EEA.135 Prior to the EEA, federal
prosecutors had to primarily rely on federal statutes prohibiting
mail and wire fraud—or, alternatively, a law targeting the
128. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1279 (holding that a former executive of a
beverage company would inevitably disclose marketing and product development
trade secrets to a competitor).
129. RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (enjoining
a tube and pipe mill manufacturing salesperson from working for a competitor
given evidence of both actual and inevitable misappropriation of proprietary data
and customer contact information).
130. See id. at 156 (“Although the courts that have embraced inevitable
disclosure have not done so in an entirely consistent fashion, the doctrine is now
considered the majority rule.”).
131. See id. at 160–63 (detailing cases in California, New York, and Maryland
rejecting the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
132. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1463 (2002) (“Lest
there be any doubt about our holding, our rejection of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine is complete.”) (citation omitted).
133. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1996); see also id.
§ 3 cmt. (“A claim for actual damages and net profits can be combined with a claim
for injunctive relief, but, if both claims are granted, the injunctive relief ordinarily
will preclude a monetary award for a period in which the injunction is effective.”).
134. Id. § 3(b).
135. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2000)).
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unauthorized access of a computer 136—to attack trade secret theft,
none of which were designed to specifically address the
misappropriation of a trade secret.137 Indeed, in many cases these
statutes did not apply to a specific incident of trade secret theft
when it turned out that the misappropriator either avoided using
the mail or electronic communications as part of his theft, or
alternatively failed to permanently deprive the owner of the
information (for instance, by simply memorizing a trade secret). 138
These limitations, combined with Congress’ growing concern over
foreign economic espionage, led to the passage of the EEA. 139
The EEA’s definition of a trade secret generally echoes that of
the UTSA,140 requiring that the owner has taken reasonable
measures to keep the information a secret and that “the
information derives independent economic value from not being
generally known.”141 The EEA criminalizes two types of trade
secret theft: (1) theft benefiting a foreign entity;142 and (2) cases of
domestic theft for economic gain. 143 Although targeting different
types of trade secret theft, both forms contain nearly identical
definitions of misappropriation, imposing liability on anyone who:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a
136. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat.
1213 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)–(6)) (2008).
137. See Kelley Clements Keller & Brian M.Z. Reece, Economic Espionage
and the Theft of Trade Secrets: The Case for a Federal Cause of Action, 16 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 8 (2013) (describing federal criminal statutes “that were
not designed to penalize trade secret theft”).
138. See Seaman, supra note 67, at 331 (noting the difficulty in relying on
more generalized federal criminal provisions to address trade secret theft).
139. See Keller & Reece, supra note 137, at 9–12 (describing the legislative
history of the EEA).
140. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 12 (1996), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4031 (“The definition of the term ‘trade secret’ [in the EEA] is
based largely on the definition of that term in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2012).
142. Id. § 1831(a)
143. Id. § 1832(a); see also Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the
Information Age: Upgrading the Economic Espionage Act After United States v.
Aleynikov, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 203 (2013) (“One of the main reasons for the
expansion of the EEA to domestic trade secret theft cases—which are far more
common than theft by foreign ones—was concern that a foreign-only law would
violate international trade treaties.”).
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trade secret; (2) without authorization copies, duplicates,
sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters,
destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends,
mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; [or] (3) receives,
buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization . . . . 144

In contrast to civil liability under the UTSA, the EEA also
prohibits both attempted trade secret theft and conspiracies to
commit misappropriation, whether domestic or foreign. 145 In
addition, the EEA has a unique mens rea component, requiring
proof of unlawful intent. 146 Under the foreign espionage provision,
for instance, the defendant must intend or know that the
misappropriation will benefit a foreign entity. 147 Similarly, under
the more generalized domestic trade secret theft provision, the
defendant must “(1) intend[] to misappropriate the secret and
(2) either intend[] to use it for the economic benefit of someone
besides the owner or intend[] or know[] that the use of the
misappropriated secret will injure the owner.” 148 Further, the
trade secret must be “related to a product or service used in or
intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce.” 149
An individual found in violation of the foreign espionage
provision can face up to fifteen years in prison and a maximum $5
million fine. 150 An organization in violation of the foreign
144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(1)–(3); see also id. § 1832(a)(1)–(3) (substituting
“information” for “trade secret”).
145. Id. §§ 1831(a)(4)–(5), 1832(a)(4)–(5).
146. See Seaman, supra note 67, at 333 (“Unlike trade secret
misappropriation under state law, the EEA demands proof of unlawful intent.”).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012).
148. Adam Waks, Note, Where the Trade Secret Sits: How the Economic
Espionage Act is Inflaming Tensions in the Employment Relationship, and How
Smart Employers and Employees are Responding, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. &
ENT. L. 391, 397 (2014) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1832; see also Robert Damion Jurrens, Fool Me Once: U.S. v.
Aleynikov and the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 833, 849 (2013) (remarking that the EEA broadened the definition of
trade secrets by “removing the confusing ‘product produced for or placed in’
language [in the original definition] and acknowledging services as well as
products”).
150. Id. § 1831, amended by The Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty
Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (Jan. 14, 2013).
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espionage provision can be fined the greater of $10 million or three
times the value of the stolen trade secret.151 Similarly, there are
also criminal fines and prison terms associated with domestic
trade secret theft. 152
5. Defend Trade Secrets Act
Amidst growing concerns about foreign trade secret theft, 153
and the attendant costs to American companies,154 as well as calls
for greater uniformity 155 and a federal forum in this area of law, 156
Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) on May 11,
2016.157 The DTSA amends the EEA to create a federal civil cause
of action for misappropriation of a trade secret. 158 Specifically, the
new law covers the theft of any trade secret “related to a product

151. Id. § 1831(b).
152. See id. § 1832(a)–(b) (stating that individuals face a fine with no specified
cap and a prison term of up to 10 years while organizations may be fined up to $5
million).
153. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON
MITIGATING
THE
THEFT
OF
U.S.
TRADE
SECRETS
1
(2013),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/938321/download (“Emerging trends
indicate that the pace of economic espionage and trade secret theft against U.S.
corporations is accelerating . . . . Foreign competitors of U.S. corporations, some
with ties to foreign governments have increased their efforts to steal trade secret
information through the recruitment of current or former employees.”); see also
Seaman, supra note 67, at 339 (discussing various government reports on the
growing threat of trade secret theft).
154. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 152, at 1 (“Trade secret
theft threatens American businesses, undermines national security, and places
the security of the U.S. economy in jeopardy.”).
155. See Seaman, supra note 67, at 352–53 (documenting and countering the
scholarly concern over a lack of procedural and substantive consistency under the
current regime of state trade secret misappropriation laws).
156. See, e.g., David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade
Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 780–81, 791 (2009)
(discussing the procedural benefits of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the advantage of federal court expertise in intellectual property law).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012).
158. See YEH, supra note 71, at 22 (“The legislation would amend the EEA’s
definition section (18 U.S.C. Section 1839) to include definitions of the terms
‘misappropriation’ and ‘improper means.’”).
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or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign
commerce.” 159
Notably, the DTSA does not preempt any state law trade
secret claims. 160 Instead, the DTSA is modeled after the UTSA,
containing the same definition of a trade secret, similarly requiring
that the trade secret owner take reasonable measures to maintain
the secrecy of the information, and that the trade secret “derive[]
independent economic value . . . from not being generally
known.”161 Likewise, there is a similar three-year statute of
limitations. 162 Consistent with the UTSA, the DTSA prohibits two
types of misappropriation: (1) acquisition by improper means and
(2) use or disclosure of a trade secret acquired by improper
means.163 And as with the UTSA, “improper means” is further
defined to include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means,” but not reverse engineering or
independent creation. 164
The DTSA is unique, however, in that it contains an ex parte
seizure provision allowing a court, “under extraordinary
circumstances, [to] issue an order providing for the seizure of
property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of
the trade secret . . . .”165 To prevail on a seizure order, the plaintiff
must establish, among other things, immediate and irreparable
harm without the seizure, the inadequacy of other equitable relief,
the likelihood of success in establishing misappropriation by
improper means, and the existence of a trade secret. 166
Otherwise, the DTSA provides traditional injunctive and
monetary relief for trade secret misappropriation, including actual
damages, damages for unjust enrichment, and reasonable royalties
for the unauthorized disclosure or use of the trade secret, as
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1).
160. See YEH, supra note 71, at 24 (stating that “the DTSA includes a ‘rule of
construction’ provision that declares that nothing in the DTSA shall be
construed . . . to preempt any other provision of law” including state laws).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
162. Id. § 1836(d).
163. Id. § 1839(5)(A)–(B)
164. Id. § 1839(6).
165. Id. § 1836.
166. Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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necessary. 167 However, the DTSA does not allow an employer to
seek injunctive relief based on the inevitable disclosure doctrine;
indeed, injunctive relief requires “evidence of a threatened
misappropriation” and cannot be premised “merely on the
information the person knows.” 168
B. Canada
With the exception of the province of Québec, the law
governing trade secrets in Canada has not been codified, but
instead has evolved from the common law. 169 Rooted in tort and
contract doctrine, Canadian courts recognize a cause of action for
breach of confidence at common law when someone misuses a
company’s confidential information. 170 Civil enforcement is the
primary means of addressing trade secret misappropriation as
there are no criminal provisions in Canada specifically addressing

167. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(C).
168. Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I).
169. See 1 FRANÇOIS PAINCHAUD ET AL., TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD § 6:3 (2015) (“Although there are no trade secret statutes that set out the
Canadian common law, there have been restatements that can be used as
guidance for the Canadian common law.”). Aside from having been codified,
Québec’s trade secrecy law is generally consistent substantively with that of the
rest of the country. See, e.g., 2 JAMES POOLEY, LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
§ 48:11 (2016)
One unusual aspect of Canadian trade secret law is the existence of
dual systems: while Québec is a civil law jurisdiction with its own Civil
Code, the other provinces of Canada base their rules on the common
law of England. Nevertheless, in general, trade secret protection is
governed by the same basic principles . . . .
170. See Allyson Whyte Nowak, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information,
27 No. 8 ACC DOCKET S4, S4 (2009) (“While there is no statutory cause of action
for the misappropriation of trade secrets or confidential information in Canada,
the misuse of your company’s confidential information can give rise to a cause of
action for breach of confidence at common law.”).
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trade secrets. 171 Both monetary and injunctive relief are available
under Canadian law.172
Similar to U.S. law, in order to prevail on a breach of
confidence claim for the misappropriation of a trade secret,
Canadian courts typically require the plaintiff to establish that it
used appropriate methods under the circumstances to maintain
the secrecy of the information at issue. 173 However, unlike U.S.
law, the plaintiff must additionally establish “the information was
communicated in circumstances in which an obligation of
confidence arises.” 174 The knowledge of the confidential nature of
the information may be established by the presence of a
confidentiality agreement or implicit in a fiduciary or master and
servant relationship. 175 Surprisingly, however, Canadian law does
not appear to directly address cases of industrial espionage or
171. See Protecting Trade Secrets: A Worldwide Survey, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP., Dec. 1997–Jan. 1998, at 40, 43 (noting the lack of Canadian criminal trade
secret statutes but recognizing that criminal theft or fraud laws may be applicable
if the trade secret is considered property); see also Emir Crowne & Tasha De
Freitas, Canada’s Inadequate Legal Protection Against Industrial Espionage, 13
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 192, 194–97 (2013) (discussing R. v. Stewart, where
the court held the unauthorized use of confidential information could not be
recognized as theft under the Criminal Code); Nowak, supra note 170, at S5
(noting Canadian law does not consider misappropriation of trade secrets to be
theft under the Criminal Code).
172. Damon L. Boyd, Trade Secret Doctrines of the NAFTA Countries: The
Sources of Law, the Remedies Available, and Suggestions for Improvement, 14
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 879, 898 (1997).
173. See Nowak, supra note 170, at S5 (2009) (“As in the United States, in
Canada the ability to prevent the unauthorized use of a trade secret depends upon
the owner's ability to demonstrate that it has been maintained as confidential
through the use of physical or contractual means.”).
174. Id.; see also Saltman Eng’g Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Eng’g Co. Ltd., [1963] 3
All E.R. 413 (C.A.).
175. See Boyd, supra note 172, at 892 (“Essentially, in order for the
information to be considered confidential it must be sufficiently private and it
must also be communicated to the other party either with a warning that it is
considered confidential, or under circumstances that make the confidential
character sufficiently clear.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Nowak, supra
note 170, at S5 (“Obligations of confidence can arise through contract or
relationships of confidence, whether they be fiduciary or that of a master and
servant.”); Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers), [1969] R.P.C. 41, 48 (“[I]f the
circumstances are such that any reasonable man standing in the shoes of the
recipient of the information would have realised [sic] that upon reasonable
grounds the information was being given to him in confidence, then this should
suffice to impose upon him the equitable obligation of confidence.”).

PROTECTING BIG DATA IN THE BIG LEAGUES

1601

other forms of trade secret theft, in which the proprietary
information is obtained via means other than being communicated
to the misappropriator in confidence. 176 Finally, Canadian law
requires the plaintiff to establish that the unauthorized use of the
information would cause a harm or detriment to the plaintiff. 177
IV. Survey Methodology and Results
Most of the various forms of proprietary data and knowledge
potentially owned by North American professional sports teams—
as identified in Part I, supra—will easily satisfy the first criterion
for trade secret protection under U.S. and Canadian law, as they
will almost always constitute “information” under the prevailing
legal definitions. 178 Moreover, such information will also typically
possess commercial value, as it will either allow the team to better
market its product to consumers, 179 or else enable the club to
improve its performance on the playing field (economists have
consistently found that winning increases a sports team’s
revenues). 180
Consequently, whether a sports team’s proprietary
information will qualify for legal protection under trade secrecy
law will usually hinge on the extent to which the information is not
publicly known, and the measures that a team takes to protect
176. See, e.g., Crowne & De Freitas, supra note 171, at 192 (“Canadian law
provides little protection for individuals and corporations against the very real
threat and damage of industrial espionage.”).
177. See Boyd, supra note 172, at 892 (“The third and final element of the
doctrine of confidentiality is that the information must have been used to the
detriment of the owner.”).
178. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of
“information” under the UTSA); see also Frankel, supra note 11, at 265
(concluding that “compilations of baseball statistics” would fall within the UTSA’s
definition of information under the conception of a “compilation”).
179. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing business-related
trade secrets that teams may possess).
180. See, e.g., Stefan Kesenne, Competitive Balance in Team Sports and the
Impact of Revenue Sharing, 20 J. SPORT MGMT. 39, 40 (2006) (noting, “[t]he season
revenue of each club depends on three important variables: a) the size of the
market, which affects the potential of the club to draw supporters and players; b)
the winning percentage of the team, because supporters prefer to watch a winning
team; and c) the uncertainty of outcome” (emphasis added)).
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it. 181 And while one cannot assess how publicly widespread the
knowledge of a particular piece of information might be without a
team disclosing the secret—thereby undermining its claim to
secrecy—ascertaining the steps that professional sports teams are
taking to protect their proprietary knowledge presents a more
reasonable inquiry.
A. Survey Methodology
Along those lines, we conducted a survey of teams in the four
major North American professional sports leagues to determine
both (i) the general types of proprietary information that they are
asserting trade secret protection over, and (ii) the measures that
they are taking to protect that data or knowledge. Specifically,
through the use of non-random, purposive sampling, 182 we began
by identifying a population of potential survey recipients
consisting of the in-house legal counsel or chief legal officers 183 for
all of the teams in the four major North American sports
leagues.184 Of the 122 teams currently belonging to these four
leagues, all but four employed one or more attorneys in some sort
of legal capacity.185 For those 118 teams that employed a lawyer,
181. See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text (explaining that trade
secrets must not be publicly known and must have been protected by reasonable
measures to keep the information secret).
182. In a survey using purposive sampling, “a specific population is identified
and only its members are included in the survey.” Kate Kelley et al., Good Practice
in the Conduct and Reporting of Survey Research, 15 INT’L J. QUALITY IN HEALTH
CARE 261, 264 (2003).
183. While most professional sports teams employ one or more individuals in
a position titled general counsel or director of legal affairs, in a few cases lawyers
serving in other roles (e.g., team president, chief operating officer, or even the
team’s owner) appeared to be chief legal officer for the franchise.
184. This identification process occurred in March and April of 2016.
185. In several instances, teams list an attorney employed by their parent
corporation as their general counsels; these individuals were included in the pool
of potential survey recipients. Similarly, in a few cases, a team identified a lawyer
practicing at an outside law firm as its general counsel; these individuals were
also listed as potential survey recipients. In other instances, the same individuals
serve as legal counsel for two commonly owned franchises belonging to different
leagues.
Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that—for whatever reason—the four teams
who did not appear to employ any in-house lawyers or regular outside counsel
were all in the NHL (the Calgary Flames, Chicago Blackhawks, San Jose Sharks,
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we were then able to locate e-mail addresses for an attorney
employed by 115 of these teams through public searches. These
individuals were each sent an email containing a link to an online,
ten-question survey.186 Recipients then subsequently received two
follow-up messages over the course of the next month. In order to
maximize the number of responses, the survey was conducted
anonymously, with respondents promised that specific responses
would not be tracked or associated with a particular team.
Ultimately, responses were received from 19 of the 115 teams
to whom the survey was sent, representing a response rate of
16.5%.187 This response rate is generally consistent with—if not
slightly above—that of the average online survey. 188 Indeed,
considering the potential sensitivity of the information sought in
the survey, this rate of response was arguably quite high. Notably,
however, this response rate, coupled with the fact the survey was
conducted on an anonymous basis, means that no degree of
statistical representativeness can be inferred from the survey
results; instead, the data presented below are offered strictly on a
descriptive basis.
B. Survey Results
Although the identity of each respondent’s team affiliation
was not tracked, Question 1 of the survey asked respondents to
identify which league their team belonged to. As listed in Table 1,
with the exception of MLB, the responses were roughly divided
and St. Louis Blues).
186. The website SurveyMonkey.com was used to host the survey and process
the responses.
187. The nineteen respondents reported here answered at least a majority, if
not the entirety, of the ten questions appearing on the survey. Because some of
these responses omitted answers to one or more questions, however, some of the
percentages listed below are based upon a smaller number of total responses,
reflecting the number of responses that answered each particular question.
Meanwhile, one respondent only provided an answer to the survey’s first
question—identifying which league his or her team belonged to—and therefore
was not included among the nineteen total responses discussed above.
188. See Andrea Fryrear, Survey Response Rates, SURVEYGIZMO (July 27,
2015), https://www.surveygizmo.com/survey-blog/survey-response-rates/ (last
visited Sept. 21, 2017) (reporting that most external, online surveys receive a
response rate of 10–15%) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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evenly among teams in the other three major North American
sports leagues.
Table 1. League Membership of Survey Respondent Teams
League
Major League Baseball
National Basketball Association
National Football League
National Hockey League
Total

Number of Respondents
2
7
4
6
19

It is not clear why MLB teams responded at such a relatively
low rate. Indeed, while nearly one-quarter of NHL teams that were
contacted provided responses to the survey (6 of 25), only two of
the 29 MLB teams contacted ultimately responded (a rate of less
than 7%). One possible explanation is that, because MLB teams
have traditionally relied on statistical and data analysis on the
most widespread basis, 189 these teams may consequently be more
hesitant to discuss this information. Alternatively, because an
MLB team was the first to fall victim to corporate espionage in the
digital age, 190 baseball teams may have simply been more
reluctant to share information in this regard. Meanwhile, because
the survey was conducted in May and June of 2016, it is also
possible that the response rate from professional baseball teams
was lower due to the fact that MLB was the only one of the four
leagues in the midst of its regular playing season,191 presumably one
of the busiest times of the year for teams’ in-house counsel. Finally,
however, MLB teams’ lower response rate could, of course, simply
be the result of random chance.
Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of responding
teams reported that they currently assert trade secret protection
over at least one of the categories of information listed in Table 2.

189. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text (discussing the
prominence of statistical analysis in professional baseball).
190. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (discussing the first
instance of corporate espionage in the professional sports context).
191. See Schedule, MLB, www.mlb.com/schedule (last visited Sept. 21, 2017)
(providing the Major League Baseball’s season schedules from March 2008 to
present) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Table 2. Types of Information Subject to Trade
Secret Assertion

Types of Information

Scouting reports (player or
team)
Trade proposal or
discussion notes
Playbooks
Verbal/hand signals used
on playing field
Player skill development
techniques
Physical training
techniques
Dietary or nutritional
regimens
Physical therapy
techniques
Statistical analyses
Biometric analyses
Psychological assessment
techniques
Not applicable
Other

Number of
Respondents
17

Percentage of Total
Respondents (n=19)
89.47%

15

78.95%

9
2

47.37%
10.53%

10

52.63%

8

42.11%

8

42.11%

7

36.84%

14
10
8

73.68%
52.63%
42.11%

1
2

5.26%
10.53%

Indeed, the most surprising aspect of the results above would
probably be the fact that one team—belonging to the NBA—
reported that it did not claim trade secret protection over any of
the types of information identified on the survey. In addition, one
respondent noted that his or her franchise also asserted trade
secret
protection
over
a
variety
of
other,
more
core-business-related processes, in addition to the more directly
sports-competition-related types of information listed above.
Of those teams that reported that they do currently assert
trade secret protection over one or more of the categories of
information above, the most common forms of proprietary
information identified—scouting reports (89.47%) and trade
discussion notes (78.95%)—were both among the more traditional
types of sports-competition-related knowledge that a team might
possess. Notably, however, the next most common types of
information listed were statistical analyses (73.68%) and biometric
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analyses (tied with skill development techniques at 52.63%), both
of which are among the more advanced types of potential trade
secrets in use today. This finding would appear to support the
anecdotal evidence discussed above suggesting that the use of data
analysis is emerging as a growing source of potential competitive
advantage for teams in all four major North American sports
leagues.192
Table 3. Methods Used to Protect Trade Secrets

Type of Protection Used

Computer security methods
(password protection, ewalls,
etc.)
Non-compete agreements
Non-disclosure/
confidentiality agreements
Not applicable
Other

Number of
Respondents
18

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=19)
94.74%

15
18

78.95%
94.74%

1
1

5.26%
5.26%

Of those 18 respondent-teams that reported that they
currently assert trade secret protection over at least one form of
proprietary knowledge, all 18 of these franchises stated that they
utilize both computer security methods and NDAs to help keep this
information secret (as indicated in Table 3). In addition, over 78%
of responding teams also reported using non-compete agreements
to maintain secrecy as well. 193 This result suggests that the use of
non-compete agreements may be even more commonplace in the
professional sports industry than in other sectors of the economy,
192. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (comparing the use of data
analytics across the four sports).
193. Although three responding teams neglected to list non-compete
agreements as being among the methods they used to protect their trade secrets
in response to Question 3, these clubs’ subsequent answers to later questions in
the survey strongly suggested that they did, in fact, ask at least some of their
employees to sign a non-compete. As a result, it appears that these three teams
inadvertently neglected to select non-compete agreements as an option when
answering this question, and thus for both completeness and consistency sake,
these franchises have been included among the 15 teams that are listed as using
non-compete agreements in the data presented in Table 3.
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as prior studies examining firms’ use of non-competes have found
that anywhere from 55% to 70% of surveyed companies use these
agreements.194 Finally, one respondent notes that in addition to
the methods identified above, his or her team also attempts to
protect its trade secrets “by hiring people who take these rights
seriously.”
Table 4. Team Employees Required to Sign
Non-Compete Agreements

Type of Employee

Coaches
Players
Front office personnel
(general managers, etc.)
Scouts
Trainers / doctors /
nutritionists
Statistical analysts
Computer programmers /
developers
Not applicable
Other

Number of
Respondents
6
3
9

Percentage of
Total Respondents
(n=18)
33.33%
16.67%
50.00%

4
4

22.22%
22.22%

7
5

38.89%
27.78%

4
3

22.22%
16.67%

The survey’s next four questions all dealt specifically with
teams’ use of non-compete agreements. As revealed in Table 4, the
category of team employee most likely to be subjected to a
non-compete agreement was front-office personnel such as the
club’s general manager or assistant general managers (i.e., the
employees most directly responsible for building a franchise’s
player roster through trades, free agency signings, and draft
picks). Indeed, 50% of responding teams said they require at least
some of their front office personnel to sign a non-compete.
Meanwhile, the second most common category of employee
subjected to a non-compete agreement was statistical analyst,
another position whose duties directly relate to building the team’s
playing roster, suggesting that franchises are most protective of
194. See Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete
Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 520 (2016) (summarizing the existing
literature on firm use of non-compete agreements).
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the competitive advantages they believe workers employed in this
capacity give them over their rivals.
Interestingly, three teams—two in the NBA, and one in the
NHL—reported that they required their players to sign
non-compete agreements as well. This result is particularly
surprising considering that player mobility in each of the four
major North American sports leagues is governed by a
collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between the applicable
players union and league, with all four leagues guaranteeing their
players the right to freely move between franchises after reaching
a certain level of seniority. 195 As a result, it is not clear what the
scope of these non-compete agreements between a player and team
may be.196
Finally, it is also worth noting that the data reported in
Table 4 should not be read to suggest that all of a team’s employees
in a particular category are necessarily subject to non-compete
agreements. Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below,197 in
some cases a team may elect to subject some of its employees in a
certain category to a non-compete agreement, but decide not to
subject others working in a similar capacity to the same
restraint. 198 Consequently, it is impossible to determine what
195. See, e.g., Chris Deubert, Putting Shoulder Pads on Schleck: How the
Business of Professional Cycling Could Be Improved Through A More American
Structure, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 65, 80–81 (2011)
In American sports, we are familiar with the concept of free agency,
e.g., when a player has accrued a certain amount of experience as
determined by a collective bargaining agreement (‘CBA’) between his
union and the teams, and his contract has expired, he may offer his
services to any and all bidders for a salary limited only by the terms of
the CBA.
196. One possibility is that teams are restricting players from going to work
for competing franchises in a front-office, coaching, or scouting capacity once their
playing careers have ended. Alternatively, these respondents may be
characterizing provisions in their leagues’ standard players contract prohibiting
players from playing for another franchise during the term of the contract as
constituting a non-compete agreement.
197. See infra notes 201–203 and accompanying text (discussing how teams
may be reluctant to subject some categories of employees to non-compete
agreements because they each wish to be able to freely recruit executives away
from one another).
198. For example, even though a number of teams reported requiring some of
their front office personnel to sign non-compete agreements, teams frequently
recruit high-level front office executives away from one another, suggesting that
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percentage of a responding team’s employees—either within any of
the individual categories above, or overall—are subject to a
non-compete agreement from the data reported above.
Question 5 inquired as to the reasons why a team might elect not
to require its employees to sign a non-compete agreement. Notably,
relatively few teams appear to be concerned with the potential legal
unenforceability of a non-compete agreement, a finding consistent
with the fact that some form of non-compete agreement is enforceable
in most jurisdictions.199 Unfortunately, given the anonymous nature
of the survey, it is impossible to determine whether those teams
expressing concern about the legal enforceability of non-compete
agreements happen to reside in California, one of the two states whose
law generally takes the most restrictive view of such contracts.200
Table 5. Reasons Why Team Employees Are Not Required
to Sign a Non-Compete Agreement
Reason

Number of
Respondents

Lack of need; employee does
not have access to trade
secrets
Perceived legal
unenforceability
Ethical concerns
League-wide rules prohibit use
League-wide custom against
use
Employee refusal to sign
Recruiting concerns
Not applicable
Other

4

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=18)
22.22%

4

22.22%

0
1
3

0.00%
5.56%
16.67%

0
0
7
1

0.00%
0.00%
38.89%
5.56%

not all of these employees are subject to a non-compete agreement.
199. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (noting that
non-compete agreements are enforceable under the law of most states).
200. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that non-compete
agreements are generally unenforceable under California state law). Meanwhile,
the other state taking a highly restrictive view of non-competes, North Dakota,
does not host a team in any of the four major North American sports leagues.
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Also noteworthy is the fact that three teams—one from MLB
and two from the NFL—reported that there is a general custom
against the use of non-compete agreements within their league. To
the extent such a custom exists, it is likely motivated by a
recognition that the potential universe of qualified applicants for
many of the vacancies that a sports team may need to fill can often
be quite small, due to the fact that assessing and coaching playing
talent is a highly unique and specialized skill in each of the four
sports. 201 So even if it might be in a team’s short-term interest to
subject all of its coaches, scouts, or front office personnel to
non-compete agreements, in the long-run franchises may recognize
that they would ultimately be hurt by the league-wide adoption of
such a strategy, since it could hinder clubs from ever hiring
qualified external candidates. 202 As a result, it would make sense
that some leagues would adopt a custom against the use of
non-compete agreements for at least some categories of employees,
in order to ensure that their franchises will be able to freely access
a sufficient pool of qualified candidates for the inevitable future
vacancies that may arise. 203 At the same time, however, the fact
that 63% of responding teams—including at least one from each of
the four major North American sports leagues—reported using
non-compete agreements raises questions regarding just how
widespread the recognition of such a custom may actually be.

201. In other words, the ability to assess the skills of professional baseball
players does not necessarily translate into an ability to assess those of
professional basketball players, and vice versa. Similarly, the exact knowledge
and skills needed to build a quality team roster, or to best physically train players
for peak on-field performance, will also vary across sports.
202. See Moore, supra note 40 (observing that the increasingly advanced
nature of MLB teams’ proprietary statistical analyses makes it harder for those
outside the industry to stay current on the latest and most advanced knowledge).
203. Indeed, as revealed in Table 9 below, at least one team has refrained
from requiring certain of its employees to sign NDAs due to the concern that
widespread use of this technique within its league could hamper its future
recruiting efforts.
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Table 6. Scope of Non-Compete Agreements

Scope of Restraint

Number of
Respondents

Working for team in same
league
Working for team in a
different league
Working for
non-sports-related business in
same geographic region
Not applicable
Other

12

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=17)
70.59%

2

11.76%

0

0.00%

4
0

23.53%
0.00%

Given the unique and specialized nature of many of the skills
utilized by a team’s various employees in each of the four sports, 204
it is not surprising that—as reported in Table 6—teams most
frequently restrict their employees from going to work for a
competing franchise in the same league. Interestingly, however, at
least two teams extend this restriction to working for franchises in
competing leagues as well. Indeed, while certainly rare, there has
been at least one case in which an executive left a team in one sport
to join a franchise in a different league. 205
Finally, as noted in Table 7, respondent teams varied with
regard to the length of time that they restrict their employees from
working for a competing franchise. That having been said, 10 of
the 11 teams to identify a temporal limit to the duration of their
non-compete agreements limit the restriction to no more than two
years. This majority approach is generally consistent with the
growing trend among courts to restrict the allowable duration of

204. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the level of
specialization necessary to identify, assess, and coach playing talent in each of
the four major North American sports).
205. Specifically, in 2016, Paul DePodesta, the former vice president of player
development and scouting for MLB’s New York Mets, left the team to join the NFL’s
Cleveland Browns as the franchise’s new chief strategy officer. See David Fleming,
Why Paul DePodesta is Bringing Moneyball to the Browns, ESPN (Apr. 11, 2016),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/15159159/why-paul-depodesta-bringing-moneyball
-browns (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (discussing same) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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non-compete agreements to two years or less, 206 while at the same
time likely providing sufficient protection for much of a team’s
proprietary information (which will often be outdated within the
span of a season or two). Meanwhile, one NFL team reported that
its non-compete provisions typically apply for the duration of the
term of the contract, should the employee prematurely terminate
his or her employment with the club.
Table 7. Duration of Non-Compete Agreements

Duration of Restraint

Less than six months
Six months to one year
1+ years
2+ years
3+ years
4 or more years
Not applicable

Number of
Respondents
0
4
6
1
0
0
6

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=17)
0.00%
23.53%
35.29%
5.88%
0.00%
0.00%
35.39%

The survey’s final three questions related to teams’ use of
non-disclosure or confidentiality agreements. As with the
non-compete agreements discussed above, Table 8 suggests that
front office personnel are also the most likely to be required to sign
an NDA. Once again, this is not particularly surprising given that
front office workers are among the most likely categories of team
employees to possess the types of proprietary information directly
related to a club’s team-building activities (such as statistical or
biometric data analyses, scouting reports, and trade discussions).
For this same reason, it is unsurprising that responding teams
reported that their statistical analysts and computer developers
are frequently asked to sign NDAs as well.

206. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (discussing the
allowable duration of non-compete agreements under the law of most states).
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Table 8. Team Employees Required to Sign a
Non-Disclosure / Confidentiality Agreement

Type of Employee

Coaches
Players
Front office personnel
(general managers, etc.)
Scouts
Trainers / doctors /
nutritionists
Statistical analysts
Computer programmers /
developers
Not applicable
Other

Number of
Respondents
13
5
15

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=16)
81.25%
31.25%
93.75%

11
9

68.75%
56.25%

12
10

75.00%
62.50%

0
3

0.00%
18.75%

Interestingly, however, coaches are the second most likely
category of team employee to be subjected to a confidentiality
agreement. This is notable because whereas only 33% of
responding franchises required their coaches to sign non-compete
agreements, 81% of these same franchises asked their coaches to
sign NDAs. This suggests that teams may be hesitant to prevent
coaches from freely moving between franchises—perhaps in
recognition of the frequent need to look outside of their own
organizations for coaching talent—but nevertheless recognize the
potential for their coaches to take valuable proprietary information
to a new employer.
Similarly, it is also noteworthy that five of the responding
teams reported requiring their players to sign NDAs. As with
coaches, this strategy makes some sense—to the extent it is
permitted by a league’s CBA 207—as even though teams may be
unable to restrict their players from freely moving between
franchises, they still undoubtedly wish to prevent these players
from disclosing the team’s proprietary information—such as

207. One responding team from the NBA reported, for instance, that its
league CBA prevented it from imposing an NDA on its players.
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playbooks, and training or dietary regimens—to their new
employers.
Finally, three respondents, all from the NBA, noted that their
teams require all of their employees to sign NDAs as a condition of
employment.
Table 9. Reasons Why a Team Employee Is Not Required to
Sign a Non-Disclosure / Confidentiality Agreement
Reason

Lack of need; employee does
not have access to trade
secrets
Perceived legal
unenforceability
Ethical concerns
League-wide rules prohibit
use
League-wide custom against
use
Employee refusal to sign
Recruiting concerns
Not applicable
Other

Number of
Respondents
6

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=16)
37.50%

0

0.00%

0
0

0.00%
0.00%

3

18.75%

0
1
7
1

0.00%
6.25%
43.75%
6.25%

Meanwhile, Table 9 reveals that responding teams indicated
that an employee’s lack of access to trade secret information is the
most common reason why a particular worker would not be
required to sign a confidentiality agreement. Similarly, three
responding teams—one each from the NFL, NHL, and MLB—
observed that there was a custom against the use of NDAs for
certain categories of employees across their league. This is the
same number of teams that indicated their use (or lack thereof) of
non-compete agreements was restrained due to a league-wide
custom. 208 Meanwhile, one team also reported that it was
concerned that widespread use of NDAs within its league could
hamper its efforts to fill vacancies in the future.
208. See supra notes 201–203 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons
why a sports team may not subject an employee to a non-compete agreement).
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Finally, Table 10 supplies data regarding the duration of the
NDAs that teams require their employees to sign. Unlike for
non-compete agreements—which the overwhelming majority of
clubs restricted in duration to less than two years—responding
teams were much more divided over the length of the
confidentiality requirements. Some of this discrepancy may be due
to the fact that states take differing views as to the allowable
duration of legally enforceable NDAs, 209 while some teams may
have instead determined that there is no need to impose a
confidentiality obligation of more than a year or two on their
employees because many of their most valuable trade secrets will
likely have a relatively short shelf life. Indeed, the longer the
duration of a non-disclosure provision that employees in an
industry are subjected to, the more difficult it can be for employees
to freely move between employers (or, at least, fully integrate
themselves into their new employer’s operations after being
hired). 210 Thus, some teams may be opting to shorten the duration
of their confidentiality agreements in order to help facilitate free
movement within the industry.

209. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (reporting that states impose
different permissible time limits on NDAs).
210. See, e.g., Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93
MINN. L. REV. 933, 986 (2009) (noting that “a confidentiality agreement could later
restrict [employee] mobility”); Patricia A. Meier, Looking Back and Forth: The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition and Potential Impact on Texas Trade
Secret Law, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 415, 439 (1996) (stating that
“confidentiality . . . clauses can . . . severely limit a workers mobility, inhibit the
use of acquired skills, and stifle economic growth”).
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Table 10. Duration of Non-Disclosure /
Confidentiality Agreements

Duration of Restraint

Less than six months
Six months to one year
1+ years
2+ years
3+ years
4 or more years
Not applicable

Number of
Respondents
0
1
5
3
1
2
3

Percentage of
Total
Respondents
(n=15)
0.00%
6.67%
33.33%
20.00%
6.67%
13.33%
20.00%

V. Implications and Suggestions for Future Research
While a precise assessment of whether teams in the four major
North American professional sports leagues are taking sufficient
precautions to protect the secrecy of their proprietary information
would require a heavily fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis, the
survey data reported in Part IV, would appear to suggest that
teams are generally taking sufficient measures to guard their
trade secrets. Indeed, the uniform adoption of computer security
methods, 211 as well as the widespread use of NDAs with the
employees most likely to possess commercially sensitive,
proprietary information, 212 indicates that the responding teams
are, for the most part, protecting their data responsibly. Assuming
that these teams also generally restrict access to their proprietary
information on a need-to-know basis—and that the underlying
information is not publicly known—then it would appear that they
would typically be able to satisfy the current standard for trade
secret protection under existing law.213
Considering that most teams are likely taking sufficient
means to protect their proprietary information, along with the
relative frequency with which employees tend to move between
211. Supra Table 3.
212. Supra note 207 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part II (discussing the standards for trade secret protection
under U.S. and Canadian law).
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professional sports franchises, it may be somewhat surprising that
trade secret disputes have not generated more litigation to date
within the industry. Even without a non-compete agreement, for
instance, teams would often appear to have a strong argument that
a departing front-office executive, statistical analyst, coach, or
trainer should be subject to an injunction under the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. 214 Since these individuals cannot be expected
to completely forget any proprietary information they may have
learned from their prior clubs upon beginning employment with a
new franchise, teams would appear to have valid grounds to seek
an injunction preventing their former employees from working in
a similar capacity for rival clubs under this doctrine, at least in the
states where it is recognized. 215
Nevertheless, it does not appear that any professional sports
team has ever gone to court to prevent an employee from working
for a rival franchise—or from otherwise using or disclosing its
proprietary information—on trade secret grounds. Indeed, the only
reported court decision considering the status of proprietary
sports-related knowledge under trade secrecy law came in 2012, in
the case of National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang.216 Rather than
involving a trade secret claim by a professional sports team,
however, the Rang case centered on a journalist’s use of scouting
reports belonging to a private scouting service. 217
The lack of litigation activity by professional sports teams in
this area can likely be attributed in no small part to the restrictive
rules that each of the four leagues imposes on its franchises. Under
214. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text (explaining the
standard for an injunction under the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
215. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (finding that a majority
of states have adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine).
216. Nat’l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 912 F. Supp. 2d 985 (W.D. Wash.
2012).
217. See id. at 988 (discussing the facts of the case, such as the plaintiff’s role
as a scouting organization in providing reports to its shareholders). In Rang, the
court ultimately held that the plaintiff’s proprietary scouting reports constituted
“information” and thus were potentially protectable under trade secret law. Id. at
996. However, because the court believed that a “factual dispute exist[ed] over
whether [the plaintiff] ha[d] made reasonable attempts to preserve the secrecy of
the information,” the court refused to grant summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
misappropriation claim. Id. at 996–97. The parties ultimately settled before that
latter question could be resolved. See Frankel, supra note 55, at 85 (noting that
the parties in Rang eventually settled the case).
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each league’s constitution, for example, teams are generally
prohibited from suing each other, or one another’s employees, in
court. 218 Instead, any dispute between rival franchises and/or their
employees is generally subject to arbitration before their
respective league commissioner. 219
Given that the four leagues have each largely prevented their
teams from litigating any potential trade secret disputes—along
with the fact that teams face differing legal landscapes under their
applicable state’s trade secrecy laws 220—this is an area that would
seem to be particularly ripe for the formulation of league-wide
policies regarding the protection of proprietary data. Under
existing law, for instance, teams residing in California would
appear to be at a significant competitive disadvantage due to their
state’s prohibition of non-compete agreements, 221 especially
considering the frequency with which the survey data reported
above suggests these restraints are being utilized across the
team-sports industry. 222
However, depending on the nature of the policy adopted,
attempts to formulate league-wide trade-secret protection
standards could raise potential antitrust concerns. Should a league
218. See, e.g., MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. VI, § 1, http://law.uh.edu/assign
ments/summer2009/25691-b.pdf
All disputes and controversies related in any way to professional
baseball between Clubs or between a Club(s) and any Major League
Baseball entity(ies) (including, in each case, without limitation, their
owners, officers, directors, employees and players) . . . shall be
submitted to the Commissioner, as arbitrator, who, after hearing, shall
have the sole and exclusive right to decide such disputes and
controversies [and whose decision shall be final and unappealable].
219. See, e.g., NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE CONST., art. VI, § 6.3(b)(5),
http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/v5/content/pdf/CoyotesDaly.pdf
The Commissioner shall have full and exclusive jurisdiction and
authority to arbitrate and resolve . . . any dispute involving a Member
Club or Clubs, or any players or employees of the League or any
Member Club or Clubs, or any combination thereof, that in the opinion
of the Commissioner is detrimental to the best interests of the League
or professional hockey or involves or affects League policy.
220. See supra Part II (observing, for instance, that states take differing views
on the enforceability of non-disclosure and non-compete agreements).
221. See supra notes 102–104 and accompanying text (discussing California’s
limitations on the use of non-compete agreements).
222. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text (noting that over 78%
of responding teams reported using non-compete agreements).
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mandate a minimum length for its clubs’ NDAs, for instance,
affected employees could potentially file suit under the Sherman
Act contending that the league’s rule illegally restrains trade by
preventing teams from competing in the employment marketplace
by offering more attractive (i.e., less restrictive) terms to their
prospective employees. 223
That having been said, a league could nevertheless
presumably adopt other, less restrictive rules that would help to
level the playing field among its teams with respect to trade secret
protection. By enacting a league-wide prohibition against
non-compete agreements, for example, leagues could ensure that
their California-based franchises are on equal footing with their
rival teams. Similarly, by enacting a league-wide limitation on the
maximum length of a potential non-disclosure obligation, leagues
could ensure that teams in states taking a more restrictive view of
these covenants are not disadvantaged in the same way. 224
Because league rules along these lines would not directly harm any
third parties by artificially restraining competition between teams,
they would appear to be less likely to trigger potential legal
liability, and would thus represent a sensible strategy for the
leagues to adopt to help place their teams on equal footing with
regards to protecting their trade secrets.
Another area in which leagues may wish to regulate their
teams’ protection of proprietary information—albeit for entirely
different reasons—relates to the use of certain biometric analyses
and physical training or therapy techniques. As noted in Table 2,
223. Because most team employees subjected to non-disclosure or
non-compete obligations—unlike players—have never formed a union, these
league-wide rules would not be shielded from scrutiny under the Sherman Act by
the so-called non-statutory antitrust exemption, and therefore would expose the
leagues to potential treble damages. See, e.g., Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker,
Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk
for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV.
341, 365 (2010) (explaining that the non-statutory labor exemption “shields from
antitrust scrutiny any conduct that is reached through the proper workings of the
collective bargaining relationship”). Admittedly, this concern may not be as
compelling for MLB, due to its historic exemption from antitrust law. See, e.g.,
Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J.
211 (2012) (providing an overview of the historical development of baseball’s
antitrust exemption).
224. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text (discussing state-level
restrictions placed on NDAs).
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supra, more than half of responding teams reported possessing
trade secrets relating to biometric analyses, while over 35% and
40% of teams, respectively, reported that they protect various
physical therapy and training techniques. While much of this
activity is unlikely to raise concern, the creation and use of some
proprietary methods in this area could give rise to potential ethical
issues that warrant league action.
For instance, if a single team were to develop a proprietary
formula allowing it to identify players who are at particular risk
for a career-threatening injury—such as a torn ulnar collateral
ligament (UCL) in a baseball pitcher’s elbow225—or were to create
a training or therapy regimen that enabled its players to better
avoid the risk of such injuries in the future, the resulting method
would represent a tremendous source of competitive advantage for
the franchise. 226 At the same time, however, allowing one team to
retain proprietary control over this type of information would have
potentially profound ethical implications for the rest of the
industry, subjecting countless other players—at both the amateur
and professional levels—to a needless risk of future injury. 227
As a result, considering that the survey data reported above
suggests that a significant number of teams may already be
claiming trade secret protection over these types of proprietary
information, each of the four major sports leagues should consider
taking steps to regulate their franchises’ activity in this regard.
Along these lines, leagues could limit the use of, or entirely
prohibit their teams from enforcing, NDAs or covenants not to
compete against the categories of employees—such as doctors or
trainers—most likely to possess knowledge relating to injury
225. For an in-depth discussion of the increasing frequency of UCL injuries in
both amateur and professional baseball, see JEFF PASSAN, THE ARM: INSIDE THE
BILLION-DOLLAR MYSTERY OF THE MOST VALUABLE COMMODITY IN SPORTS (2016).
226. See, e.g., Matthew Trueblood, Rubbing Mud: A Solution Does Not Exist,
BASEBALLPROSPECTUS (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?
articleid=25709 (last visited Sept. 21, 2017) (quoting Andrew Friedman, president of
MLB’s Los Angeles Dodgers, as saying, “I would contend that any kind of advantage in
injury prevention is significant”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
227. See Injuries Increase As Pitchers Throw Harder, Faster And Younger,
NPR
(Mar.
31,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/03/31/472541597/
injuries-increase-as-pitchers-throw-harder-faster-and-younger (last visited Sept. 21,
2017) (noting the “inherent conflict” when teams “are doing everything they can to
figure out [injury prevention techniques] and not tell[ing] anyone about it”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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prevention techniques. At a minimum, leagues should make an
effort to invest in their own injury prevention research, centralized
within the league office, to help ensure that any strides made in
this area will benefit all players and teams on an equal basis.
Finally, with regards to future research activity, this study
has highlighted the current lack of empirical data regarding the
types of information that are being subjected to trade secret
protection in the modern economy, as well as the ways in which
the secrecy of this knowledge is being protected. Indeed, prior to
this study, it appears that the only published research of this sort
dates back to 1965 and 1971, respectively. 228 While researchers
may have previously assumed that firms would be reluctant to
share this type of information, given its potential sensitivity, the
present study suggests that companies in other industries—
especially those in less intensely competitive fields than
professional sports—would likely be willing to disclose some
general details regarding their trade secret practices.
Meanwhile, although the survey data presented here provides
a novel look at the protection of trade secrets within the
professional sports industry, it does not paint a complete picture.
In particular, further research regarding the manner in which
teams differentiate between employees when deciding whom to
subject to a non-disclosure or non-compete obligation would be
instructive. 229 Along these lines, although potentially difficult to
conduct, a survey conducted at the employee-level could, if feasible,
yield particularly interesting results. Such data would help
provide a clearer indication of the overall rate at which employees
in the professional sports industry are subject to non-disclosure or
non-compete agreements.

228. See generally O’MEARA, HOW SMALLER COMPANIES PROTECT THEIR TRADE
SECRETS, supra note 13; O’MEARA, EMPLOYEE PATENT AND SECRECY AGREEMENTS,
supra note 13.
229. For instance, as noted above, despite the fact that 50% of responding
teams reported requiring their front-office personnel to sign non-compete
agreements, the fact that teams routinely hire front-office executives away from
one another would suggest that the enforcement of these provisions may not be
uniform. Supra Table 5; supra notes 202–203 and accompanying text.
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VI. Conclusion

This Article has explored the protection of trade secrets in the
professional sports industry. In particular, through the
presentation of freshly collected survey data, the Article has shed
new light on both the types of information being subjected to trade
secret protection by franchises in the four major North American
sports leagues, as well as the methods that these teams use to
preserve the secrecy of their proprietary knowledge. In the process,
this Article has identified ways in which sports leagues may wish
to act in order to level the playing field amongst their franchises—
especially in light of the differing legal regimes governing teams in
this area at the state level—while also highlighting the need for
additional research regarding the trade secret protection practices
of firms within both the professional sports industry and the
economy at-large. Indeed, considering the increasingly significant
role that big data is poised to play in the economy in coming years,
issues surrounding the legal protection of this sort of proprietary
information will only take on heightened importance in the future.

